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APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE AND THE FUTURE
OF PUBLIC COMPANY M&A
CHARLES R. KORSMO
MINOR MYERS*
ABSTRACT

In this Article, we demonstrate that the stockholder's appraisal
remedy-long-dismissed in corporate law scholarship as useless or
worse-is in the middle of a renaissance in public company mergers. We
argue that this surge in appraisal activity promises to benefit public
shareholders in circumstanceswhere they are most vulnerable.
We first show a sea change in the use of appraisal in Delaware.
Relying on our hand-collecteddata, we document sharp recent increases
in the incidence of appraisalpetitions, in the size of the petitioners'
holdings, and in the sophistication of the petitioners targeting public
deals. These litigants appear to invest in target company stock after the
announcement of the merger and with the intention of pursuing appraisal.
In short, this is appraisalarbitrage. There is every reason to believe that
appraisalnow stands as the most potent legal challenge to opportunistic
mergers.
We also present evidence showing that these appraisalpetitions bear
strong markers of litigation merit-they are, in other words, targeting the
right deals. Nevertheless, defense lawyers have recently suggested that
appraisalarbitrageconstitutes some sort of "abuse" of the remedy and
ought to be stopped. This nascent argument has matters precisely
backwards.
This new world of appraisal should be welcomed and indeed
encouraged. Our analysis reveals that appraisalarbitragefocuses private
enforcement resources on the transactions that are most likely to deserve

* Korsmo is Associate Professor at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, and
Myers is Associate Professor at Brooklyn Law School. We have received helpful input and comments
on earlier drafts from Barry Adler, Ian Ayres, Quinn Curtis, Brad Davey, Steven Davidoff, George
Geis, Jeffrey Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, J. Travis Laster, John Morley, Adam Pritchard, Roberta
Romano, and participants at the American Law & Economics Association Annual Meeting, the
Harvard/Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, the National Business Law Scholars Conference, the
Federalist Society Junior Scholars Colloquium, the George Washington C-LEAF Workshop, the 2013
Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Widener University School of Law faculty
workshop, and the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law workshop. Since a draft of our
companion paper on this topic was first circulated, we have provided compensated advice on appraisal.
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scrutiny, and the benefits of this kind of appraisalaccrue to minority
shareholders even when they do not themselves seek appraisal. In this
way, the threat of appraisalhelps to minimize agency costs in the takeover
setting, thereby decreasing the ex ante cost of raising equity capitaland
improving allocative efficiency in public company mergers and
acquisitions. We offer some modest reforms designed to enhance the
operation of the appraisalremedy in Delaware.
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INTRODUCTION

Stockholder appraisal is undergoing a profound transformation in
Delaware. We demonstrate that appraisal activity has grown rapidly over
the past three years, and this rise in appraisal litigation has been
accompanied by the appearance of a new breed of appraisal arbitrageur.
These developments-in stark contrast to other types of stockholder
litigation-hold out great promise for stockholders and corporate law
generally.
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Stockholder appraisal is a unique remedy in corporate law: it allows the
stockholder to forego the merger consideration and instead file a judicial
proceeding to determine the "fair value" of the shares.' We have collected
data on all appraisal cases in Delaware for the ten-year period from 2004
2
to 2013 and present the main results of our study in this Article. Our
Article is the first to provide a comprehensive examination of appraisal
litigation. The lack of prior work no doubt stems from the prevailing
academic view that appraisal "is seldom utilized" 3 and that the hurdles
involved make it too cumbersome for stockholders to call upon
profitably.4 These dismissive attitudes towards appraisal are consistent
with prior research finding that the appraisal remedy is not economically
significant.
With this Article, we show that this view is now badly out of date.
Appraisal activity involving public companies is undergoing explosive
growth in Delaware, driven by sophisticated parties who specialize in
bringing appraisal claims. The value of claims in appraisal in 2013 was
nearly $1.5 billion, a tenfold increase from 2004 and nearly one percent of
the equity value of all merger activity in 2013.6 Furthermore, the
institutions bringing these claims are not the Potemkin "institutions" that
often appear in securities or derivative litigation.7 Appraisal claims are
being brought by sophisticated entities that appear to have developed
specialized investment strategies based on appraisal. This type of investing
has come to be known as appraisal arbitrage and has utterly transformed
what may once have been accurately characterized as a sleepy corporate
law backwater.
While we can offer no perfect explanation for the rise in appraisal
arbitrage, we can confidently dismiss two possible explanations that have
been suggested.8 The first ties the increase in appraisal to In re Appraisal

1. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015).
2. Our focus is on Delaware because it is the most influential corporate law jurisdiction, home
to more than half of all publicly traded companies in the United States and nearly two-thirds of the
Fortune 500.
3. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 282 introductory note (1995).

4. E.g., Cox, HAZEN & O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS 595-96 (1997). ("[Appraisal] is rarely the
remedy of other than the 'wine and cheese' crowd, for seldom is appraisal sought by investors whose

holdings are less than $100,000.").
5. Paul Mahoney and Mark Weinstein found no evidence that the availability of appraisal is
associated with higher merger premiums for target shareholders. Paul G. Mahoney & Mark Weinstein,

The AppraisalRemedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 239, 242 (1999).
6. See infra Part lI.A.
7. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
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of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., a 2007 Chancery Court decision.9
Transkaryotic expanded the time frame for purchasing appraisal-eligible
stock in advance of a stockholder vote to approve a merger. But the
judicial ruling itself likely contributed little, if at all, to the rise in appraisal
arbitrage. Transkaryotic only marginally expanded the time available to
arbitrageurs for evaluating appraisal claims and, more importantly, only
affected a subset of merger transactions. Thus, the larger trend is unlikely
to be the result of the Transkaryotic holding. Likewise, a new statutory
interest rate available to appraisal petitioners (the federal funds rate plus
five percent) is unlikely to have been the catalyst for the appraisal boom.o
Given the risks an appraisal petitioner must assume-an extended period
of illiquidity with an unsecured claim against a surviving company that
may be highly leveraged, plus the risk of the legal claim itself-the idea
that interest rates are driving sophisticated parties to target appraisal is

implausible.
Whatever its cause, the surge in appraisal litigation implicates a host of
important public policy questions. The increased activity coincides with a
rise in stockholder fiduciary litigation generally." By many accounts, that
fiduciary litigation is a hotbed of nuisance claims of dubious social
value.1 2 Accordingly, it is natural to fear that the increase in appraisal
arbitrage is an ominous development. Appraisal litigation, however, is
structured in a way that renders the risks of meritless, attorney-driven
litigation remote.
In particular, two unique features distinguish appraisal. 13 First,
appraisal claims can be purchased: a stockholder need not own the stock
on the date the challenged merger is announced.1 4 This feature stands in
contrast to a standard stockholder claim, where the only stockholders who
may press a claim are those who owned the stock at the time of the alleged
wrong.'" Second, there is no conventional class action: a stockholder is

9. 2007 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. 2007).
10. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) ("Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise
for good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the merger through the date of payment of the
judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate
I.

See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State

Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2015) (documenting the rising incidence of
merger class actions).

12. See infra note 117.
13. See infra Part IlIl.A.
14. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 368 (Del. Ch. 2008).
15.

See Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the

Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 892-93 (2014).
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only eligible to file an appraisal petition if she affirmatively opts-in by
6
meeting certain procedural requirements.1 The result is a form of
aggregate litigation where the aggregation is performed, and the litigation
controlled, by the actual plaintiff-the appraisal arbitrageur-rather than
the plaintiffs' attorney. Indeed, some of the largest appraisal petitioners
appear to shun contingency arrangements altogether and instead pay their
attorneys by the hour. In addition, the narrow focus of an appraisal claim
and the possibility a court will determine fair value to be below the merger
price render the risks and costs of litigation far more symmetric than in
other forms of shareholder suit, further reducing the potential for nuisance
claims.
We test these propositions empirically and show that appraisal suits
7
indeed bear multiple indicia of litigation merit.1 The analysis presented
below reveals that appraisal petitioners target transactions with lower deal
premia and also going-private transactions, where minority shareholders
are most likely to face expropriation. By contrast, the size of the
transaction-believed to correlate more with the size of the potential
nuisance settlement and long the chief determinant of fiduciary
litigation-does not appear to matter at all for appraisal petitioners." We
present summary results on these points here and report these findings
more fully in a companion paper.19
In light of these empirical findings, we argue here that the rise of
20
appraisal arbitrage is, on balance, a beneficial development. Much as the
market for corporate control generates a disciplining effect on
management, a robust market for appraisal arbitrage could serve as an
effective back-end check on expropriation from stockholders in merger
transactions. The implications in related-party mergers are plain: appraisal
can protect minority holders against opportunism at the hands of
controlling stockholders. And in third-party transactions, appraisal can
serve as a bulwark against sloth, negligence, or unconscious bias in the
sales process. For appraisal to perform such a role, however, a deep and
2
active appraisal arbitrage market is necessary. ' By buying up large
positions after the announcement of a transaction, arbitrageurs can
overcome the collective action problems that would otherwise render

16.

See infra note 56.

17. See infra Part IlI.B.
18.

See Korsmo & Myers, supranote 15, at 882-84.

19. Id.
20. See infra Part IV.
21.

See infra PartIV.
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appraisal ineffective. At bottom, appraisal arbitrage solves the same
collective action problems that class action and other aggregate litigation
seeks to solve, but without generating a serious agency problem in the
process.
A highly developed appraisal arbitrage market would aid minority
shareholders-even those not equipped to pursue appraisal themselvesby deterring abusive mergers and by causing shares traded postannouncement to be bid up to the expected value of an appraisal claim.22
Such a result would benefit not only minority shareholders, but also-in
the long run-controlling shareholders, entrepreneurs, and the economy at
large. If appraisal arbitrage reduces the risk of expropriation faced by
minority shareholders, it will increase the value of minority stakes and
thus reduce the costs of capital for companies and increase the allocative
efficiency of capital markets as a whole.23
In spite of our empirical findings that appraisal activity is associated
with merit, and the benefits we argue will be generated by increased
appraisal arbitrage, defendants have already begun to argue that appraisal
arbitrage constitutes an abuse of the appraisal process.24 This may be, in
part, an attempt to re-litigate the point in Transkaryotic and foreclose any
shares acquired after the voting record date from seeking appraisal. More
generally, this may be the opening salvo in an attempt to curtail appraisal
rights by altering the substantive standard in appraisal proceedings. We
believe that either would be a regrettable misstep for Delaware law. One
of the great virtues of appraisal litigation is that its substantive standard
defies manipulation and cannot be evaded or altered by purely procedural
means such as the formation of a committee or inclusion of a particular
voting provision in a merger agreement.25 We show here that the choice to
initiate appraisal proceedings appears strongly focused on litigation merit.
It would be a cruel irony if appraisal litigation-where the evidence
suggests that the merits matter-were to be "reformed" by importing
features of fiduciary merger litigation, where the evidence suggests the

22.

See infra Part IV.

23. See infra note 160.
24. See In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., No. 9079-VCL, Letter to J. Travis Laster from Bruce
L. Silverstein, Dec. 27, 2013, at 3 ("These appraisal actions are being pursued by 'appraisal
arbitrageurs,' who [sic] Dole understands to have acquired all or substantially all of their shares
following the public announcement of the transaction-including many shares acquired after the
record date for the vote on the merger, and some shares acquired even after the merger was approved

.

by public stockholders. Dole respectfully submits that this is an abuse of the appraisal process . .
25. See In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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legal merits are functionally irrelevant.26 Indeed, the more promising
direction of reform is the reverse: borrowing features from appraisal and
applying them to other forms of shareholder litigation. We offer some
tentative thoughts on potential reforms along these lines.27
This is not to suggest that the appraisal remedy, as currently
constituted, could not be improved. Indeed, the basic premise of
appraisal-that a judicial proceeding can provide a more reliable valuation
of stock than some market process-fails in predicable circumstances. In
our view, a genuine market test of the target company will necessarily
provide a superior valuation of the stockholders' interest, and in such
circumstances an appraisal proceeding can only cause mischief. For this
reason, we would support the development of a safe harbor to eliminate
appraisal where the transaction has undergone a true auction. A target
could affirmatively seek the protection of the safe harbor only by
subjecting itself to a genuine market test, not merely by engaging in a
procedural kabuki dance that happens to satisfy Revlon.28 Our second
reform proposal focuses on decoupling appraisal rights from the form of
merger consideration. Delaware currently limits the availability of
appraisal to mergers where the consideration takes certain formsprimarily cash or non-public shares. We argue that the form of merger
consideration should be irrelevant to eligibility for appraisal. The
adequacy of the consideration paid in a merger does not, at the end of the
day, depend on the form of that consideration. Our two reform proposals
together would improve the functioning of appraisal arbitrage as a
mechanism of corporate governance.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief summary of the
structure of appraisal litigation and prior scholarly perspectives. Part II
presents the results of our empirical investigation of appraisal activity,
showing since 2011 a large increase in activity and the emergence of
appraisal arbitrageurs. Part III demonstrates that the merits appear to
matter in the decision to file appraisal petitions. Part IV argues that, in
light of these empirical findings, appraisal arbitrage has the potential to
play a beneficial role in corporate governance. Part V suggests reforms for
appraisal and for fiduciary litigation.

26. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15, at 870-78
27. See infra at Part V.

28. See Barkan v. Arnsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
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I. THE ROLE OF APPRAISAL IN CORPORATE LAW

Appraisal allows a stockholder to dissent from a merger and forego the
merger consideration in favor of filing a judicial proceeding that will
determine the "fair value" of the stock cancelled in the merger. 29 This Part
describes the design of modem appraisal statutes in Delaware and
elsewhere and also outlines the overwhelmingly pessimistic view of
appraisal in prior legal scholarship.
A. The Statutory Design ofAppraisal
The origin of the modem appraisal action can be traced back to basic
changes in American corporate law at the beginning of the twentieth
century.3 o Older corporate codes required the unanimous consent of all
shareholders before a merger or other fundamental change. 3 ' The holdout
problem-a single shareholder could stand in the way of any significant
transaction-became severe as companies increasingly tapped public
equity markets.32 In response, states amended their corporate codes to
eliminate the requirement of unanimity and replace it with a majorityvoting rule. This change stripped minority shareholders of protection
against majority expropriation, and the appraisal remedy emerged as
something of a replacement.3 4 Appraisal affords minority shareholders

29. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 (2008).
In this paper, we focus on mergers involving Delaware entities and will therefore largely limit the
discussion to Delaware law.
30. While some form of appraisal rights existed in a few jurisdictions as long ago as the middle
of the nineteenth century, they only became available widely in their modem form in the early
twentieth century. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL

ANALYSIS § 7.1, at 75 (1976).
31. See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate
Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-14 (1995); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders'AppraisalRemedy and
How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 618-19 (1998).
32. See William J. Camey, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 81 ("It became increasingly apparent to observers
that great benefits to society, to the corporation, and derivatively to the rest of the shareholders were
sometimes blocked to protect interests that seemed quite minor . . . to the remaining shareholders and
perhaps to most outsiders."); Thompson, supra note 31, at 12-13.
33. See Camey, supra note 32, at 94 ("Over the first third of the twentieth century the pattern of
allowing fundamental changes in all corporations to take place on something less than a unanimous
shareholder vote became the norm . . . .").
34. See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 Nw. L. REV. 1635, 1642 (2011)
("[Appraisal] mushroomed in the early 1900s, when state lawmakers granted appraisal rights to
shareholders-apparently in exchange for an easing of merger voting requirements.") (footnote
omitted); Thompson, supra note 31, at 14 ("Appraisal statutes are often presented as having been
enacted in tandem with statutes authorizing consolidation or merger by less than unanimous vote
. . . ."); Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of DissentingStockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 547-48 & n.7
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who object to a fundamental transaction the opportunity to exit from the
35
enterprise on terms set by a judge instead of majority shareholders.
The availability of appraisal rights varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. In MBCA states, appraisal rights are available in a wide array
of circumstances, including a merger, a sale of assets, or an amendment to
the certificate of incorporation.36 In Delaware, by contrast, only mergers
give rise to appraisal rights. 37 For public companies, the form of
consideration also affects eligibility for appraisal. The remedy is available
if cash is the merger consideration but not if shareholders receive stock in
the surviving entity or in another widely traded entity-the so-called
"market out" exception.3 8 Even when a transaction gives rise to appraisal
rights, stockholders must affirmatively comply with a number of
requirements to be eligible to pursue the remedy. For example, the
39
stockholder must not vote in favor of the merger, must deliver to the
40
company a written demand of appraisal rights, and must file a petition in
41
the Court of Chancery within 120 days of the merger's effective date.

(1927) (listing states enacting an appraisal remedy in the early twentieth century); Wertheimer, supra

note 31, at 614 ("The origin of the appraisal remedy typically is tied to the move in corporate law ...
away from a requirement of unanimous shareholder consent."). But see Mahoney & Weinstein, supra
note 5, at 243 (questioning whether appraisal statutes were a direct reaction to elimination of
unanimity requirements).

35. See Geis, supra note 34, at 1643 ("[A]ppraisal rights were therefore enacted in most
jurisdictions as an emergency exit from majority rule. A merger could move forward with less-than-

unanimous approvals, but minority owners had an escape if they disliked the shift in direction.");
Thompson, supranote 31, at 26. In this respect-as in others-appraisal is a highly unusual remedy in
corporate law. Shareholders do not, under normal circumstances, have the power to withdraw their

proportional interest from the firm's assets. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del.
Ch. 2013) ("Equity capital, by default, is permanent capital."); Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital:
What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV.
387 (2003); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110

YALE L.J. 387 (2000). Usually, the only "exit" for disgruntled shareholders is to sell their shares in a
secondary market. But appraisal is an instance where a shareholder may, in effect, withdraw their
interest in the firm other than via market exit.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02(a)(3).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2015).
See id § 262(b).
Id.
Id § 262(d)(1). Such a demand is usually simply a short statement informing the issuer of the

number of shares held and the intent to seek appraisal.

41. Id. § 262(e). A shareholder that makes demand need not ultimately file a petition for
appraisal, and retains the right to back out and take the merger consideration within sixty days of the
effective date of the merger. Id.
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B. The Critiqueof Appraisal
Appraisal has long been regarded in the corporate law literature as an
almost useless remedy. Scholarly commentators throughout the 1960s and
1970s heaped scorn on it. Bayless Manning issued perhaps the most wellknown indictment in a 1962 Yale Law Journalpiece, describing appraisal
as "of virtually no economic advantage to the usual shareholder except in
highly specialized situations.' 2 Similarly, Victor Brudney and Marvin
Chirelstein called it a "last-ditch check on management improvidence,' 3
and Melvin A. Eisenberg described it as a "remedy of desperation."" Part
of the reason these commentators found appraisal so pointless is that
transactions can often be structured to avoid it. At a Delaware firm, for
example, a sale of all assets would have the same economic effect as a
merger but, unlike a merger, would not give rise to appraisal rights.
Academic commentary continues to take a sweepingly dismissive view
of appraisal.45 The modern critique faults appraisal because, as one
Delaware court noted, it is "chock-full of disadvantages for
shareholders.'A 6 These disadvantages tend to fall into three categories:

42. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 260 (1962) ("The appraisal remedy is of virtually no economic advantage to the usual
shareholder except in highly specialized situations.").
43.

Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, FairShares in CorporateMergers and Takeovers,

88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 304 (1974).
44.

Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern

CorporateDecisionmaking,57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969).
45. E.g., Bradley R. Aronstam, R. Franklin Balotti & Timo Rehbock, Delaware's Going-Private
Dilemma: Fostering Protections for Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal

Exploration, 58 Bus. LAW. 519, 546 (2003) ("[l]n practice, the appraisal remedy is replete with
shortcomings and therefore fails to protect adequately minority shareholders from majoritarian
abuse."); John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law

Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359, 412
(1996) ("Standing alone, the appraisal remedy cannot begin to assure the receipt of proportionate
value."); Jesse Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture CapitalistControl in Startups, 81 N.Y.U.

L. REV. 967, 1005 (2006) ("The shortcomings of the appraisal remedy are widely known.
Commentators have long recognized that appraisal is a remedy that few shareholders will seek under
any circumstance.") (footnote omitted); Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 829, 830 (1984) (arguing that appraisal suffers from "substantial defects in the ability
of state corporate law to ensure dissenting shareholders the fair value of their shares."); Guhan
Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 31 (2005) ("[lIt is well accepted among academic
commentators and practitioners that appraisal is a weak remedy compared to entire fairness review.").
See also Cox, HAZEN & O'NEAL, supra note 4, at 601 ("[T]he risk of considerable expense as well as
the procedural difficulties in pursuing the [appraisal] remedy further decrease its effectiveness in
protecting minority shareholders."); 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supranote 2, at 282

("The practical utility of the appraisal remedy as a protection for minority shareholders has been the
subject of much debate, and few legal commentators have been confident that the remedy works
sufficiently well to play a major role in corporate governance.").

46. Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 547 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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(1) the procedural burdens of preserving and asserting an appraisal
remedy; (2) the inability to proceed as a class and shift attorneys' fees to
shareholders as a whole or to defendants; and (3) the narrow and inflexible
nature of the remedy available. Taken together, these disadvantages have
led many scholars to believe that appraisal will almost never prove useful.
The literature is replete with references to the supposedly Byzantine
procedure for asserting one's appraisal rights. Leading casebooks refer to
7
appraisal as "a cumbersome remedy,'A and one that requires shareholders
of Delaware corporations to navigate a "complicated maze ... to
successfully assert appraisal rights."A4 Others have suggested that
"[a]ppraisal litigation is complicated and expensive" and that "many
shareholders find it difficult to meet the complicated procedural
9
requirements and deadlines of the appraisal remedy."4 On top of the
supposed complexity, a shareholder bringing an appraisal action in
Delaware is required to forego the merger consideration, and thus may not
finance the litigation out of the merger proceeds, such that they "may
50
receive no return on their investment for prolonged periods of time."
5
Indeed, courts in appraisal actions can, and occasionally do, ' determine
fair value of the plaintiffs shares to be less than the merger
52
In contrast, fiduciary duty class action plaintiffs have
consideration.
typically already received the merger consideration and face no financial
downside, giving fiduciary litigation an option value that is absent in
appraisal actions.53
Perhaps the main reason given for the supposed impotence of the
54
While
appraisal remedy is the inability to proceed as a class.
class
stockholder
typical
in
a
be
represented
to
desiring
not
shareholders

47. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW

§

12.2, at 508 (1986) ("[A]ppraisal is often a

cumbersome remedy.").
48. PETER V. LETSOu, CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 429 (2006).

49. Fried & Ganor, supra note 45, at 1004.
50. Mary Siegel, Back to the Future:Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 79 (1995).

51. See infra Part Il.A, at n.126.
52. See Siegel, supra note 50, at 103 ("[S]hareholders in appraisal actions risk the possibility of
receiving less than the transaction price.").

53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 192 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting the "unavailability of a
class action and fee shifting in appraisal actions"); Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 548 (Del. Ch.
2000) ("[T]he unavailability of the class action mechanism in appraisal also acts as a substantial
disincentive for its use."); Fried & Ganor, supra note 45, at 1004 n.105 (2006) ("In Delaware,
shareholders seeking appraisal are barred from using class action suits.").
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action must try to opt-out,55 shareholders seeking judicial appraisal must

"opt-in." 6 Moreover, because dissenting shareholders must vote against
the merger and give notice of intent to pursue appraisal, the process of
opting-in must actually begin long before the appraisal petition is filed.57
As Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon note, this procedural difference
between opt-out fiduciary litigation and opt-in appraisal litigation is
"ultimately of enormous substantive consequence."
Given the superficial similarity of the issues and remedies involved in a
fiduciary duty proceeding and in an appraisal action, the availability of
class treatment in the former potentially makes it far more attractive, at
least in theory. 59 The major benefit of class treatment to the plaintiff (or
her attomey) is that it allows litigation costs to be spread over the
potentially much larger class of aggrieved minority shareholders.o Some

55.

Indeed, this option is not necessarily available in a fiduciary class action. See In re Celera

Corp. S'holder Litig., 59 A.2d 418, 434-37 (Del. 2012) (describing the limited circumstances where
stockholder can opt-out of merger class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2)).
56. See, e.g., 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 267 n.6 ("[T]he

appraisal remedy differs from the procedural rules applicable to the class action, which assume that
investors who do not 'opt out' desire to be represented."); Aronstam, Balotti, & Rehbock, supra note
45, at 547 ("[Tihe appraisal statute creates an 'opt-in' class for minority shareholders as opposed to the
'opt-out' default mechanism of class action lawsuits. Thus, only shareholders specifically electing to
opt in will be able to benefit from a judicial determination diverging from the corporation's initial
valuation.").

57. See Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co. ex rel. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 657
A.2d 254, 260 n.10 (Del. 1995) ("In an appraisal proceeding, however, shareholders enter the appraisal
class by complying with the statutory formalities required to perfect their appraisal rights. Thus,
shareholders seeking appraisal 'opt in' to a class, invariably before suit is even filed, rather than 'opt
out."').

58. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 785, 798 (2003).
59. Id. at 831-32 ("[A]n entire fairness proceeding .. .provides the equivalent of a class
appraisal proceeding without the need for shareholders actually to perfect their appraisal rights").
60. Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 194 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("In a class action, the plaintiffs
lawyers can take their fees and expenses against any class-wide recovery, whereas in an appraisal

action the fees and expenses can be recovered only as an offset against the appraisal award to the
usually far smaller group of stockholders who perfected their appraisal rights."). Elsewhere in its
opinion, the Andra court notes that in an "entire fairness" proceeding, "the non-tendering stockholder
may spread her litigation costs over any classwide recovery and may obtain an order requiring the

defendants to pay her attorneys' fees, thus making it easier for her to find legal representation and
enabling her the possibility of a full recovery." Id. at 184. The court goes on to point out that "[i]f
relegated to an appraisal action, the non-tendering stockholder will have to cover her attorneys' fees

out of any recovery she (and the usually smaller group of appraisal petitioners) obtain and will be
unable to proceed as a class representative on behalf of all similarly situated stockholders." Id. See,
e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND

ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 215 (9th ed. 2004) ("[T]he appraisal remedy lacks the class action's ability to
secure automatic representation and a greater recovery for shareholders."); Fried & Ganor, supra note

45, at 1004 n.105 ("In Delaware, shareholders seeking appraisal are barred from using class action
suits. Because each shareholder must pursue his own individual claim, shareholders lose the important
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commentators also suggest that the unavailability of attorney fee-shifting
in most Delaware appraisal actions further increases the relative costs of
6
appraisal litigation to the plaintiff. 1 Fee shifting, however, may be less
economically significant than it appears at first glance. Even where fee
shifting is available, any fees must come out of what the defendant would
otherwise be prepared to offer to settle the case. In most cases, it will make
little economic difference whether the defendant pays the plaintiffs'
attorneys-in which case the defendant will be willing to pay less to settle
the case-or if the plaintiff pays-in which case it will come out of the
settlement. In either situation, the plaintiff ends up bearing most or all of
the economic cost. The more significant difference between a fiduciary
class action and an appraisal action stems not from the unavailability of
fee shifting, but rather that a larger class leads to a larger plaintiff group
and greater leverage to extract a settlement. Plaintiffs' attorneys in
62
fiduciary class actions can bear the up-front costs of bringing a claim,

economic benefits of class actions, which spread the costs of litigation and facilitate contingency
financing.").

61. See, e.g., Andra, 772 A.2d at 194-95 ("Class actions and fee shifting are crucial if litigation
is to serve as a method of holding corporate fiduciaries accountable to stockholders. Without them,
collective actions problems would make it economically impractical for many meritorious actions to

be brought."); Aronstam, Balotti, & Rehbock, supra note 45, at 546 ("Most problematic is that in
contrast to the class action model where fees and costs incurred by successful shareholders can be
shifted to the class or the corporation, the statutory regime for appraisal rights requires individual

shareholders to foot these costly expenses on their own."); Subramanian, supra note 45, at 30

("[U]nlike plaintiff shareholders in a class action claim for entire fairness, plaintiffs in an appraisal
proceeding must bear their own costs, including legal fees and the costs of expert witnesses.").
62. Gilson and Black describe the dynamic thusly:
Most importantly, the [fiduciary duty] suit can be brought as a class action. Minority
shareholders need take no affirmative action in order to participate, nor need they expend any

resources to pursue the action. All the responsibility-both for initiating the action and for its
expenses-is bome by the self-designated lawyer for the class who is compensated, one way
or the other, out of the amount recovered. The lawyer then stands, in effect, as an independent
investor who balances his estimate of the potential recovery to all shareholders against the
cost of the proceeding and the uncertainty associated with its outcome.
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuiSITIONS

1267 (2d ed. 1995). Similarly, Mary Siegel notes:
Just as shareholders have financial incentives to pursue non-appraisal actions, plaintiffs'

attorneys are similarly motivated by the size of potential fees. While most jurisdictions
provide that attorneys' fees in appraisal awards may be apportioned from the recovery, as are
fees in class actions, these equivalent structures often do not produce equivalent results. The
potential amount of the attorneys' fees-and therefore their willingness to undertake a

matter-is directly linked to the number of shares in the plaintiff class. In appraisal
proceedings, the class tends to be small. In contrast, the representative nature of a class action

does not require any action by individual shareholders, except for those shareholders desiring
to 'opt out' of the class. Ease of formation, coupled with a lack of financial concerns, tends to
make the plaintiff group in class actions relatively large. The allocation of attorneys' fees as a
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secure in the knowledge that they will be able to settle the claim for at
least nuisance value.
Appraisal is potentially even less attractive in view of the narrow scope
of the remedy available. Plaintiffs in appraisal actions are limited to
receiving fair value for their shares. Typically, of course, that is precisely
the remedy the shareholder wants. Nonetheless, this limited remedy has a
tactical drawback compared to the otherwise similar fiduciary duty class
action. 4 The threat of injunction or rescission-even where it is not really
what the stockholder is after-can significantly increase the settlement
leverage of a plaintiff in a fiduciary duty class action.
With these disadvantages in mind, it is easy to see why so many
commentators have come to the conclusion that plaintiffs will rarely, if
ever, choose to pursue an appraisal action instead of a fiduciary duty class
action. All of the "incentive[s] for plaintiffs [are] to reject the technically
easier option of an appraisal action for the more onerous burden of
proving a fiduciary breach." 66 With a fiduciary class action almost always

percentage of the recovery of the class, when the process is skewed toward creating a large

class, may be the pivotal reason for the preference for class actions.
Siegel, supra note 50, at 103-04.
63. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)-(i); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182,
1187 (Del. 1988) ("[I]n a section 262 appraisal action the only litigable issue is the determination of
the value of the appraisal petitioners' shares on the date of the merger, the only party defendant is the
surviving corporation and the only relief available is a judgment against the surviving corporation for

the fair value of the dissenters' shares."); Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 55 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("[l]t is
clear that the sole remedy that will be available in an appraisal proceeding is a fair value award. . . .").
64. See Cede, 542 A.2d at 1187 ("In contrast [to appraisal], a fraud action asserting fair dealing
and fair price claims affords an expansive remedy and is brought against the alleged wrongdoers to
provide whatever relief the facts of a particular case may require.").
65. See Siegel, supra note 50, at 104 (1995) ("The ability to seek an injunction or rescissory
damages significantly strengthens the minority's bargaining power. As a result, plaintiffs are drawn to
class actions to air a broader range of grievances."). The Andra court recognizes this possibility, while
emphasizing the relatively greater importance of the class size. See Andra, 772 A.2d at 194 ("[T]he
Litigation-Cost Benefits ofa class action that most often makes an unfair dealing claim so much more
attractive than appraisal from a plaintiffs perspective, not the theoretical possibility of an award of
(rarely granted) rescissory damages.").
66. Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 548 (Del. Ch. 2000). See, e.g., Wertheimer, supra note
31, at 623 n.52 ("There are numerous economic incentives for shareholders to challenge acquisition
transactions in class action lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty, rather than in appraisal
proceedings."); see Andra, 772 A.2d at 196 ("The substantial procedural advantages of equitable
actions has naturally led to a strong preference for such actions over the otherwise seemingly attractive

(from a plaintiff's perspective) prospect of appraisal actions focused solely on a fair value remedy.");
Siegel, supra note 50, at 103 ("For a variety of reasons, shareholders have incentives to pursue class
actions instead of, or in addition to, their appraisal action.").
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available to challenge suspect transactions, 6 7 one might simply conclude
that appraisal is unnecessary and can safely be abandoned.
Several commentators, however, have suggested that appraisal should
be reformed, rather than consigned to the scrap heap. 8 Naturally enough,
suggestions for reform center on making the appraisal action look more
like the typical fiduciary duty class action. 6 9 Most prominently, a number
of scholars have suggested extending opt-out class treatment to appraisal
actions.70
Modifying appraisal to allow opt-out class treatment would, however,
potentially have substantial downsides, in addition to any upside gained.
Class treatment would almost certainly expand the practical availability of
appraisal and could theoretically help address any under-deterrence
problem. But it would also introduce the same agency-cost dynamics that
have traditionally bedeviled shareholder litigation. As we explain, the very
feature of appraisal action that attracts the most criticism-the
unavailability of class treatment-also has the great virtue of largely
eliminating the kinds of agency problems that can lead to abusive and
wasteful shareholder litigation.7 1 Furthermore, the new phenomenon of
appraisal arbitrage has the potential to solve the same collective action

67. Andra, 772 A.2d at 192 ("[Ilt has become nearly impossible for a judge of this court to
dismiss a well-pled unfair dealing claim on the basis that appraisal is available as a remedy and is fully
adequate.").

68. See, e.g., GILSON & BLACK, supra note 62, at 1267 ("[E]specially because the absence of a
class action mechanism makes it impossible for lawyers to act, in effect, as surrogates for minority

shareholders with respect to whether to invest in an appraisal proceeding, most shareholders will not
dissent. As a result, many of the minority shares can be purchased for less than what would be the
'appraisal' price."); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 215 ("[T]hose planning the merger or other

transaction have an incentive to offer an unfairly low price, even if they expect to be required to pay a
much higher price to shareholders who seek appraisal, because they anticipate that only a small
minority of shareholders will do so."); Siegel, supra note 50, at 104 (footnote omitted) ("Thus, as
shareholders often choose a non-appraisal remedy, the appraisal remedy today does not provide the
protection for majority shareholders that Dean Manning envisioned.").

69. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 215 ("[T]he key policy issue about the appraisal
remedy is the degree to which it should be reformed to resemble the class action and thereby provide
some form of collective representation that may be elected at low cost.").

70. See, id.; see, e.g., GILSON & BLACK, supra note 62, at 1268 ("[E]ven if the substance of the
remedy for failing the entire fairness standard did not differ one whit from that which would be
forthcoming in an appraisal proceeding, the availability of the class action mechanism to enforce a
violation . . . meant that substantially more shareholders could benefit from it."); KLEIN & COFFEE,

supra note 60, at 215 ("[T]he appraisal remedy lacks the class action's ability to secure automatic
representation and a greater recovery for shareholders."); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 58, at 837

("[A] class-based appraisal remedy-the equivalent of a Sinclair remedy-is called for regardless of
the transaction form, and the holding that the Delaware Supreme Court should reconsider is the
chancery court's application of Solomon to freeze-out tender offers, rather than Kahn Ps provision of

class-based appraisal.").
71. See infra note 116.
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problems addressed by aggregate litigation, while avoiding the agency
problems that plague class actions.
A singular feature of appraisal litigation-and one essential to the rise
of appraisal arbitrage-is that standing to bring an appraisal petition is not
limited to investors who held stock at the time of the announcement. In
securities and derivative litigation, standing to bring the claims is limited
by the so-called contemporaneous ownership requirement.72 This means
that investors who acquire the stock after the alleged wrong may not bring
suit to remedy it. Appraisal is different in an important way: an investor
who acquires the stock after the announcement of the merger may still
pursue appraisal. The cutoff for acquiring stock with appraisal rights
depends on the structure of the transaction,n but investors generally have
long enough to examine proxy statements, tender offer statements, or other
informational material before deciding whether to acquire stock with
appraisal rights. This means that an investor can accumulate a large stake
in a company after the announcement of a merger and still pursue
appraisal rights in court.74
II. THE RISE OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE

Prior examinations of appraisal have largely taken place in an empirical
vacuum. To remedy this, we have collected all appraisal petitions filed in
the Delaware Court of Chancery for the ten-year period from the start of
2004 through the end of 2013. In addition, by examining public filings we
have collected information on the dissenters and their claims.75 The focus
of our analysis is on appraisal petitions filed against public companies.7 6

72. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2015) (requiring for derivative suits that "the plaintiff was
a stockholder of the corporation at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains.").
While on its terms, Section 327 only applies to derivative suits, a contemporaneous ownership
requirement has also been imposed in direct actions in the context of lead counsel or lead plaintiff

selection. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 809 A.2d 1163, 1169-70 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(dismissing fiduciary duty claims because plaintiffs' shares were purchased after the merger
announcement); see also J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement,

33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 680 n.36 (2008) (noting that Delaware courts "bar direct actions by afteracquiring shareholders").
73. See infra text accompanying note 99.
74. See Merion Capital v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 5, 2015) (holding that petitioner who acquired stock after the announcement of the merger was
entitled to pursue appraisal); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 66825,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (same).
75. Our data collection is described more fully in our companion paper. Korsmo & Myers, supra
note 15.
76. We restrict our study to public companies for three reasons. First, the scarcity of data
regarding private companies renders them less amenable to study. Second, public company mergers
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We use this data set to provide the first full picture of modem appraisal
activity.
Our data reveal Delaware is in the midst of a sea change in appraisal
litigation. While appraisal may once have been a quiet corner of corporate
law, it is now an area of active litigation undergoing a period of explosive
growth. Furthermore, the parties driving that growth are a new group of
sophisticated investors who appear to specialize in pursuing appraisal
claims.78 In short, we have documented the rise of appraisal arbitrage.
A. The Surge in AppraisalActivity
A basic result of our investigation is that appraisal activity involving
public companies increased substantially starting in 2011, as measured
both by the number of petitions filed and the value of the dissenting
shares.
The most basic way to measure appraisal activity is by the raw counts
of petitions filed. During our ten-year period of study, 129 appraisal
petitions were filed in Delaware involving counseled petitioners.7 9 Figure
1 shows the number of petitions filed per year.

and their accompanying appraisal actions are far more economically significant. See Korsmo & Myers,

supra note 15, at 879-82. Third, the type of appraisal arbitrage we discuss is generally only possible
for public company mergers.

77. Earlier empirical studies of appraisal activity include Randall Thomas, Revising the
DelawareAppraisalStatute, 3 DEL. L. REv. 1 (2000) (examining appraisal actions filed between 1977
and 1997), and Randall Thomas & Robert Thompson, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-OrientedClass Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 133 (2004) (including data on appraisal actions
from 1999 and 2000).
78. By contrast, in a 2007 article, Kahan and Rock observed that hedge funds bringing appraisal
actions did so primarily as a last resort. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate

Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1038-39 (2007) (suggesting that
"[w]hen hedge funds are dissatisfied with the terms of an acquisition and unable to obtain better terms,

they also resort to litigation" and giving examples including appraisal).
79. Seven petitions involved disputes with only pro se petitioners. We exclude them from our
analysis because they are of little economic significance and are unlikely to reflect any broader pattern.
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FIGURE 1
COUNSELED APPRAISAL PETITIONS PER YEAR, 2004-2013
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Figure 1 shows the effective year of the underlying transaction, rather
than the filing year of the petition.80 The reason for focusing on the
transaction year is that a petitioner has 120 days following the effective
date to file a petition, and the effective date better captures the timing from
the perspective of the appraisal investor, who will have already begun the
process of dissenting at that point. The basic change in appraisal activity is
evident from Figure 1. The level of appraisal activity in 2011 and 2012
was matched earlier only in 2007, and activity in 2013 has only increased.
This represents a lower bound of appraisal activity in Delaware because
some claims by dissenting shareholders are resolved before the petition is
ever filed.

80. If, for example, a transaction closed on December 31, 2012, and a petitioner filed for
appraisal on January 1, 2013, the petition would be included in the statistics for 2012.
81. Dissenters have until 120 days after a merger closes to file an appraisal petition. See Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(e). Potential claims may be settled during this period without a petition ever
being filed. Because these settlements would only be binding on the parties to them, they would not
need to be filed publicly and are thus not reflected in our data set. Thus, the number of actual appraisal
disputes is necessarily larger than the universe of petitions that we are able to observe. It is thus
possible that total appraisal activity-including settlement discussions that never result in a petition
being filed-has not increased as much as Figure I suggests. It may be that more appraisal petitioners
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The recent change in appraisal activity becomes even more apparent
when we compare appraisal claims to the number of appraisal-eligible
mergers. From 2004 through 2010, the number of appraisal petitions
moved roughly in tandem with the general level of merger activity, rising
through 2007 and thereafter falling along with the number of mergers after
the financial crisis. A more or less constant percentage of mergers
attracted appraisal claims in this period. This pattern changed sharply,
however, beginning in 2011. Despite a lower level of overall merger
activity, the number of petitions filed in 2011 and 2012 matched the
number filed at the peak of the pre-financial crisis merger wave, and the
number of petitions in 2013 is larger still. This change in the pattern of
appraisal litigation comes into sharper relief in Figure 2, which presents
appraisal petitions as percentage of appraisal-eligible mergers.
FIGURE 2
OF APPRAISAL-ELIGIBLE
PERCENTAGE
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A
PETITIONS
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who once would have been able to quietly settle are now being forced to file and thus make their
claims public (and observable)-though discussions with experienced counsel make this possibility
seem remote.
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Approximately five percent of appraisal-eligible transactions attracted
at least one appraisal petition from 2004 through 2010. The appraisal rate
more than doubled in 2011 and has continued to increase since then. By
2013, more than fifteen percent of transactions attracted an appraisal
petition.
The raw numbers or percentage of deals facing appraisal petitions,
however, tell us little about the economic significance of appraisal
litigation. Using the merger price and the number of dissenting shares, we
can calculate the amount of foregone merger consideration in each
appraisal dispute, obtaining at least a rough measure of the economic value
at stake in the case.
The values at stake in appraisal proceedings have also increased
sharply in recent years. The 129 petitions we observed involved 106
separate transactions over our study period. The mean value of the
foregone merger consideration in an appraisal dispute over the entire
period was $30 million and does not appear to have followed any strong
trend over time. When combined with the increase in the number of
petitions over time, however, the total dollar amount at stake in appraisal
proceedings in each year shows a large increase in recent years,
particularly the most recent year. Figure 3 shows the value of the
dissenting shares in Delaware appraisal petitions for each year of our study
period.
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FIGURE 3
VALUE OF DISSENTING SHARES IN DELAWARE APPRAISAL,
(IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 2013 DOLLARS)
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The amount of money involved in 2013 is nearly three times the
amount involved in any prior year and ten times the 2004 amount. To
some extent, this effect is driven by outliers. The largest appraisal case
over our study period is Dell, a 2013 transaction where $654 million worth
of shares dissented. The second largest is Transkaryotic Therapies
("Transkaryotic"), a 2005 transaction where $520 million worth of shares
sought appraisal.82 But in some ways, excluding these two very large cases
only makes the new trend clearer. Without Transkaryotic, the values at
stake in appraisal never exceeded $300 million in any given year; while in
2013 the values at stake approach one billion dollars even excluding Dell.
Most tellingly, over the ten-year period, only eight appraisal cases have
involved more than $100 million, and four of them were in 2013.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about appraisal activity during the
new 2011 to 2013 era is that, unlike 2007 and 2008, the increase in
numbers and economic significance of appraisal does not coincide with an

82. In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. CIV.A 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at
*1 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (noting merger consideration of $37 per share and nearly 11 million shares
seeking appraisal).
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increase in merger activity. In other words, the rise in appraisal activity
since 2011 appears to reflect a secular increase in interest in appraisal,
rather than a mere cyclical phenomenon tied to the conditions of the
merger market. For each year in our study period, we tallied the equity
value of all appraisal-eligible transactions and then computed the
percentage of value that sought appraisal. In 2013, 0.92% of the equity
value dissented, nearly three times higher than any prior year. Indeed, the
percentage of dissenting equity value was never higher than 0.10% in any
prior year except 2005, the year of Transkaryotic.83
B. The SophisticationofAppraisalPetitioners
In addition to the increasing volume of appraisal activity-measured
both in number of petitions and the dollar values at stake-the profile of
the public company appraisal petitioner has changed sharply in the recent
period. In particular, petitioners have become increasingly specialized and
sophisticated over our time period, with repeat petitioners increasingly
dominating appraisal activity. Since 2011, more than eighty percent of
appraisal proceedings have involved a repeat petitioner-that is, a
petitioner who filed more than one appraisal petition across our study
period. Three constellations of related funds appear more than ten times
each. Perhaps the most striking result of our investigation is the increase in
the economic significance of repeat players in appraisal. Figure 4 shows
the value of shares per year in appraisal held by repeat petitioners.

83.

In 2005, 0.37% of equity value dissented.
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FIGURE 4
REPEAT PETITIONER VALUE IN DELAWARE APPRAISAL, 2004-2013
(IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 2013 DOLLARS)
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The rise in repeat petitioner value beginning in 2010 is immediately
apparent. Before 2010, appraisal appears to have been largely a one-off
exercise for aggrieved stockholders. Repeat petitioners played a small role,
and there is little evidence that funds were seeking appraisal as part of a
considered investment strategy. Starting in 2010, however, and
accelerating through 2013, the repeat petitioner dominates. Indeed, every
appraisal case filed in 2013 involved at least one repeat petitioner.
By virtue of the unique standing requirements in appraisal,8 4 these
specialized appraisal petitioners are typically able to invest in the target
company after the announcement of the transaction they challenge. The
decision to invest, then, is based on a calculation that the amount they will
be able to recover in an appraisal proceeding in Delaware-via trial or
settlement-will exceed the merger price by enough to offer an attractive
return. This practice can be fairly characterized as appraisal arbitrage-by
analogy to traditional merger arbitrages 5-and those who practice it may

84. See supra note 74, at 22.
85. Hedge funds have long practiced merger arbitrage, taking positions after announcement of a
merger, intending to profit by either predicting the reaction of the stock prices of the target and
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be termed appraisal arbitrageurs.86 Table 1 presents summary statistics for
repeat dissenters. The first column reports the total value of stock the fund
or group of funds has dissented on in our study period; the second column
reports the number of transactions in which the fund has publicly
dissented; the third column reports the mean value of the petitioner group
filing the case. The second column reports the mean value of all dissenters
in the case (including those who did not file petitions), which compared to
the third column reveals whether the fund tends to operate by itself or
often ends up in cases with other dissenters.
TABLE 1
REPEAT DISSENTERS IN DELAWARE, 2004 TO 2013
(IN MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 2013 DOLLARS)

Fund
name
Merion
Magnetar
Verition
Merlin
Quadre
Patchin
Predica

Total value
of dissenting
stock
$718,000,000
$163,000,000
$96,200,000
$51,000,000
$18,700,000
$22,700,000
$5,197,291

Number of Mean value
Mean value of
cases
ofpetitioners all dissenters
in case
in case
8
$89,700,000
$107,000,000
3
$54,400,000 $317,000,000
4
$24,000,000
$37,100,000
22
$2,318,373
$5,592,174
10
$1,869,953
$4,258,385
16
$1,420,945
$1,557,664
5
$1,039,458
$1,039,458

Unlike in fiduciary litigation-where "professional plaintiffs" tend to
be small shareholders with close ties to plaintiffs' firms-the repeat
appraisal petitioners, especially at the top end of the field, appear to be
sophisticated parties specializing in appraisal. For example, the largest

acquiring companies or by predicting the likelihood and timing of the consummation of the announced
merger. See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 52 (Sept. 2004),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2004/02/pdf/chp2.pdf (defining merger arbitrage);

Mark Mitchell & Todd Pulvino, Characteristicsof Risk and Return in Risk Arbitrage, 56 J. FIN. 2135
(2001) (describing merger arbitrage strategies); Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics ofHedge
Funds: FinancialInnovationand Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 240, 270 (2009) ("A type
of corporate event driven strategy is merger arbitrage, which seeks to purchase the stock of a company

that has just announced it will be acquired and sell short the stock of the acquiring company with the
expectation that the acquiring company's stock will fall after the acquisition and the acquired
company's stock will increase.").
86. In fact, appraisal arbitrage is not true "arbitrage," in the sense that it does not involve
exploiting a price difference that is eventually expected to disappear. The term "arbitrage" is used
somewhat loosely here in order to draw an analogy to merger arbitrage.
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repeat petitioner is Merion Capital, with over $700 million invested in
appraisal claims. Merion has been involved in seven cases since 2010,
with increasingly large amounts at stake. The fund is based in
Pennsylvania and headed by Andrew Barroway, a successful plaintiffs'
lawyer from Philadelphia. It made its first public appraisal investment in
2010, with $8.5 million at stake. After a number of appraisal petitions
averaging around $50 million in value at stake during 2012 and 2013,
Merion reportedly raised a targeted amount of $1 billion for a dedicated
appraisal fund in 2013.87 During 2013, it filed two appraisal petitions with
an average value at stake of $177 million.
Another large and recent repeat petitioner is Verition Fund, a
Greenwich-based fund that has been involved in four cases, all in 2013,
with an average of $25 million at stake. Verition is managed by Nicholas
Maounis, who formerly headed Greenwich-based Amaranth Advisors .88
Other recent entrants are Fortress Investment Group, a large publicly
traded hedge fund, and Hudson Bay Capital Management, both of which
filed large appraisal petitions in 2013. Similarly, major mutual funds and
insurance companies-two types of institutions that have entirely avoided
standard stockholder litigation-have recently filed appraisal petitions.89
Much is often made of the involvement of institutional investors (or the
lack thereof) in corporate governance. 90 All too often in corporate
litigation, the so-called "institutions" are akin to the Bailiffs' Retirement
Fund of Chippewa Falls, while sophisticated financial players remain on
the sidelines. 9' The institutions that are beginning to specialize in

87. Miles Weiss, Dell Value Dispute Spotlights Rise in Appraisal Arbitrage, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Oct. 2, 2013.
88. See Gretchen Morgenstern & Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund's Loss Rattles Nerves, N.Y.

TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at Cl.
89. Examples of mutual funds that have recently filed are T. Rowe Price (C.A. 9322-VCL) and
John Hancock (C.A. 9350-VCL). Examples of insurance companies are Prudential (C.A. 9351 -VCL)
and Northwestern Mutual (C.A. 9321 -VCL). All of these petitions challenge the merger price in the
Dell transaction.
90. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Casefor Increasing ShareholderPower, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor

Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MIcH.
L. REV. 520 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agendafor Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman,
Let the Money do the Monitoring: How InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities

Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995).
91. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Matthew C. Jennejohn, Putting
Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed Complaint, 69 Bus. LAw. 1, 11, n.36 (2013) (noting the
prevalence of cases involving "institutional investor" plaintiffs with trivial stakes); David H. Webber,
PrivatePolicingofMergers and Acquisitions:An EmpiricalAssessment ofinstitutionalLead Plaintiffs
in TransactionalClass and DerivativeActions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907 (2013-2014).
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appraisal, by contrast, are among the most sophisticated financial entities
in the United States.
Beyond the bulge bracket appraisal petitioners are a handful of
specialized smaller funds that have been quite active. Some join larger
petitioner groups, perhaps to capture economies in pursuing the case. A
larger group may make the threat to go to trial more credible, increasing
the bargaining position of all dissenters. Two features of the Delaware
appraisal statute make this strategy possible. First, after the merger closes,
a dissenter stockholder is entitled under Section 262(e) to demand a
statement of the aggregate number of shares demanding appraisal from the
surviving company. 92 A dissenter might seek this information to confirm
the existence of other dissenters who, for example, can help spread the
costs of prosecuting the appraisal case. If the dissenter does not like the
results of the information supplied by the company, it has a statutory right
to withdraw its dissent and accept the merger consideration.93
C. The IncreasinglyCompetitive World ofAppraisalLitigation
The manner in which appraisal litigation proceeds also appears to be
changing in ways that may indicate increasing competition among
appraisal petitioners. Dissenting shareholders have 120 days following the
merger's effective date to file a petition in court demanding the judicial
appraisal. 9 4 That 120-day period can often be a time for negotiation, and
the parties may settle their dispute before ever filing a claim. Figure 5
shows a kernel density plot95 of filing times from the effective date of the
merger for two appraisal petitions challenging two sets of mergers:
(1) those from 2004 through 2010, shown in black and (2) those from
2011 through 2013, shown in gray.

92.
93.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
Id.

§ 262(e)

(2015).

94. Id.
95. A kernel density plot is essentially a smoothed histogram, treating each observed instance as
representing a larger unobserved population.
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The black line suggests that petitioners commonly took the entire 120
days to negotiate over their disputes before filing in the 2004 through 2010
period. The gray line shows the lag between the merger and the filing from
2011 through 2013, and reveals that parties are filing their petitions much
faster, more often not bothering to go through an initial round of
settlement discussions before filing. We can only speculate on the causes
of this, but one explanation may indeed be increasing competition among
shareholders dissenting on the same transaction. One of the advantages of
filing is that it compels the surviving company to identify publicly all
other shareholders who have preserved the right to seek appraisal. 9 6 Doing
so may make it harder for other dissenting shareholders to strike a separate
bargain without including the filing shareholder. Filing faster may also
provide an advantage in selecting lead counsel and managing the claims.
The new filing pattern may also indicate that petitioners do not believe
that claims are likely to settle without substantial litigation activity, and
they may be anxious to proceed to discovery. In any event, we tentatively

96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(f) (2015).
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interpret this shift as a sign that appraisal arbitrage is becoming more
competitive.
D. What Explains the Rise in AppraisalArbitrage?
We lack a compelling explanation for the rise in appraisal arbitrage
identified here. We can, however, confidently dismiss two theories that
have sometimes been offered by defense-side lawyers to explain this
increase.
The first theory that has often been floated is that a 2007 Chancery
decision called In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies9 7 opened the
floodgates for appraisal litigation. The Transkaryotic opinion arose from
an extremely large appraisal proceeding involving nearly half a billion
dollars in foregone merger consideration." Many of the shareholders
seeking appraisal had acquired their stock after the record date for voting
in the merger, but before the actual vote on the merger. 0 0 The court held
that holders of shares acquired during that period were eligible to pursue
appraisal, despite the inability of the petitioners to show how the shares
had been voted, so long as the total number of shares seeking appraisal did
not exceed the total number of "no" votes plus abstentions.10' According
to defense attorneys, appraisal arbitrageurs "are taking advantage of the
flexibility of Transkaryotic." 0 2
The trouble with this explanation is that the Transkaryotic holding-in
addition to coming out nearly four years before the recent surge in
appraisal activity-created only a marginal increase in the window of time

97. No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1 (Del. Ch. 2007).
98.

See, e.g., Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb Appraisal Arbitrage

Abuses, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/02/10/
delaware-legislature-should-act-to-curb-appraisal-arbitrage-abuses (claiming appraisal arbitrage was
"spawned by Transkaryotic"); Daniel E. Wolf et al., Appraisal Rights-The Next Frontierin Deal
Litigation?, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (May

1, 2013), http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/

MAUpdate 050113.pdf (describing the Transkaryotic decision as significant factor in the rise of
appraisal litigation).
99.

In re Transkaryotic, at *1

(noting merger consideration of $37 per share and nearly II

million shares seeking appraisal).
100. Id. (noting that approximately 8 million out of 11 million shares were purchased after the
record date).
101. Id. at *4. More precisely, since the record holder of the relevant shares in Transakaryotic was
Cede & Co. (as is the case for most publicly traded shares), the plaintiffs simply needed to show that
Cede & Co. itself held more shares that had voted "no" or abstained than the number of shares for
which appraisal was being sought. Id. at *5 ("Only the record holder possesses and may perfect
appraisal rights. The statute simply does not allow consideration of the beneficial owner in this
context.").

102. Weiss, supra note 87.
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during which would-be appraisal petitioners may buy stock. Weeks or
months typically pass between the announcement of a transaction and the
record date, and stock acquired in that period has always been available
for appraisal. A company's preliminary proxy statement, of course, may
disclose new information that would make an appraisal claim more
attractive, and the Transkaryotic ruling allows potential investors more
time to consider the proxy contents. By the same token, the Transkaryotic
ruling also ensures that companies cannot set the record date
opportunistically to preclude appraisal claims. The more fundamental
problem with relying on the Transkaryotic decision to explain the rise in
appraisal claims is that Transkaryotic is only relevant in a transaction
structure that contemplates a shareholder vote, and many do not. In a
tender offer followed by a Section 251(h) merger, a short-form merger, or
a merger approved by written consent of a majority of holders, no
shareholder vote is required and thus the Transkaryotic ruling can have
had no impact. These types of transactions constitute a substantial portion
of M&A activity, and an even larger proportion of appraisal targets.
To investigate the possible role of Transkaryotic, we separated out
transactions that were affected by the ruling and those that were not, and
examined the change in appraisal litigation for each group. Our data show
that the rise in appraisal activity appears strongest outside of the
transaction structure affected by Transkaryotic. The Chancery Court
issued the Transkaryotic decision in the summer of 2008. During the
period from 2004 to 2007, stockholders filed appraisal petitions in
approximately 5% of transactions structured as a tender offer and
approximately 5% of those structured as a standard merger with a
shareholder vote subject to the Transkaryotic rule. If the Transkaryotic
ruling mattered, we would expect to see that transactions affected by the
ruling would be more likely to involve an appraisal petition. We find the
opposite. In the post-Transkaryotic era, from 2009 to 2013, stockholders
dissented in approximately 9% of transactions subject to Transkaryotic.
By contrast, in tender offer deals-which were entirely unaffected by the
ruling in Transkaryotic-the appraisal rate was 13%. These numbers
suggest that whatever legal changes were wrought by the Transkaryotic
decision do not appear to have moved the needle on appraisal activity.
The second explanation sometimes offered is centered on the interest
rates available to appraisal petitioners. Appraisal petitioners are entitled to
interest on amounts recovered in their petitions from the effective date of
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the merger. Delaware amended its appraisal statute in 2007103 to set the
interest rate equal to the federal funds rate plus five percent, compounded
quarterly.'0 Some lawyers have suggested that in an era of historically
low interest rates, the interest rate available to appraisal petitioners has
attracted investors to appraisal.105 The apparent theory is that an investor
could park money in an appraisal claim, and even if the court found the
merger price to represent fair value, the investor would receive an
attractive return. Vice Chancellor Glasscock, too, has voiced a "concern
about whether the interest rate that the Legislature has set encourages
these types of appraisal cases."'0 6
In our view, the statutory interest rate cannot account for the rise in
appraisal activity. As an initial matter, the timing does not line up: interest
rates dropped precipitously in 2009, two years before the sharp rise in
appraisal activity. More fundamentally, it is unlikely that a five percent
premium over the federal funds rate would represent an attractive return
under the circumstances, given the substantial risks associated with an
appraisal proceeding. Appraisal petitioners function as unsecured creditors
of the surviving company, holding a claim of uncertain value to be
determined by litigation. While the statutory rate no doubt is better than
what petitioners could get in a money market account, it likely
undercompensates them for the risk of their position. The appraisal interest
rate surely defrays some of the risk, particularly compared to other
conventional measures of interest in legal scenarios. But petitioners are
exposed not only to the credit risk of the surviving company, but also to
the financial risk associated with the trial. Petitioners are only entitled to
demand an award of interest if they take their claims all the way to trial,
which typically takes well over a year and carries with it the risk that the
appraised value could be less than the foregone merger consideration. The
idea that sophisticated investors are pouring hundreds of millions of

103. See 76 Laws 1998, ch. 145 §§ 11-17, eff. July 17, 2007.
104. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) ("Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise
for good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the merger through the date of the payment of
the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount
rate .... ).

105.

See Daniel E. Wolf, Appraisal Rights-The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?, HARVARD

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BLOG (May 16, 2013, 9:30 AM) ("In today's ultra-low interest rate setting,
the accumulating interest payments represent, if not an intriguing stand-alone investment opportunity,

at least a meaningful offset to the extended period of illiquidity and litigation costs imposed on the
dissenting shareholders for the duration of the proceedings.").
106. Transcript of Scheduling Conference at 18, In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig. (Sept.
23, 2013).
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dollars into risky appraisal proceedings to chase above-market interest
rates simply is not credible.
Yet another potential explanation for the rise of appraisal litigation is
that it is simply part of the roughly contemporaneous trend in merger
litigation. As others have shown, fiduciary class actions challenging
mergers have recently become ubiquitous, touching over 90% of
transactions above $100 million.10 7 Our own data on fiduciary challenges
to mergers-which cover only appraisal-eligible transactions-confirm
this same phenomenon. In 2004, 36% of transactions attracted a fiduciary
challenge; by 2013, 90% of transactions did. Figure 6 shows the trend in
fiduciary litigation from 2004 to 2013 in gray and plotted on the left axis,
and it shows the trend in appraisal litigation over the same period in black
and plotted on the right axis.
6:

FIGURE
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107. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2012 (Feb. 1, 2013),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-2216727 (finding that ninety-two percent of all transactions with
a value greater than $100 million experienced litigation in 2012). See also Robert M. Daines & Olga
Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involving Mergers and Acquisitions, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH
(Feb. 2013 Update), available at www.cornerstone.com/files/upload/CornerstoneResearch_
Shareholder Litigation_1nvolvingM-and_A_Feb_2013.pdf (making similar findings).
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Fiduciary litigation rose sharply in 2009, and since 2010, stockholders
have challenged more than eighty-five percent of transactions. The rise in
appraisal litigation did not start until 2011, two years after the litigation
rate rose in fiduciary litigation. It certainly could be the case that there is
some connection between the rise in the two types of litigation, given that
they both involve legal action relating to mergers. Beyond these
superficial similarities, however, there is no reason to conclude any
connection between the two types of litigation. The parties who appear to
be driving appraisal arbitrage-the sophisticated investors we described
above-have little connection to fiduciary litigation and historically have
had no interest in it. There are thus no grounds to suspect that the rise in
appraisal activity has anything to do with the rise of fiduciary litigation.
In the end, we can identify no single causative factor to account for the
rise in appraisal arbitrage. We suspect that it may simply be a case of a
few investors who, somewhat by accident, found themselves considering
appraisal as a method for salvaging an investment following a bad merger,
became intrigued by the opportunity, and explored it further. As word
spread of their success, others mimicked the strategy. Indeed, the
Transkaryotic transaction itself-and not the judicial opinion that grew out
of it-may have functioned as a catalyst for interest in appraisal. Among
the class of dissenting shareholders in Transkaryotic were some of the
most sophisticated entities on Wall Street, including various Carl Icahn
affiliates, SAC Capital Advisors, and Millennium Management.108
Transkaryotic was acquired by Shire Plc for $37 per share.10 9 Appraisal
cases that settle are not made public because unlike standard shareholder
litigation they do not bind non-signatories.o But Shire is a public
company and had to disclose developments in the litigation in its periodic
SEC reports. Shire announced the settlement of the Transkaryotic claims
in November 2008,"' and it disclosed that the settlement "paid the same
price of $37 per share originally offered to all TKT shareholders at the
time of the July 2005 merger, plus interest." 1 2 This account of the

108. See Petitioners' Answering Brief in Oppositionn to Respondents' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2006 WL 4790526 (Del. Ch.
2006) (listing entities seeking appraisal).
109. See In re Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *1.
110. See Siegel, supra note 50, at 84, n.17 (noting that "[t]here is no way to document the number
of appraisal settlements.").

Il l. See Press Release, Shire Plc., Shire Successfully Settles Former TKT Shareholder (Nov. 12,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/936402/000095010308002790/dpI 1808
ex9901.htm.
112. Shire Plc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2009).
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Transkaryotic settlement frequently appears in subsequent retellings of the
113
case.
This description of the settlement, however, obscures its significance.
First of all, paying interest in a settlement is puzzling: a settling acquirer is
under no obligation to include interest in the settlement, and, in any event,
this case was filed before Delaware adopted the statutory interest rate
discussed above. Moreover, from the petitioners' perspective, the label
attached to the settlement funds is unimportant-a dollar is a dollar,
whether it is part of the "settlement price" or the "interest" on the
14
settlement price. Shire only disclosed the aggregate interest award,' but
by dividing this amount by the number of shares seeking appraisal it is
possible to determine the per share figure for the entire settlement:
precisely $50 per share. Thus, the amount of the "interest" award appears
to have been reverse-engineered to achieve a pre-determined (and
favorable) per-share settlement price. The net result was that the
petitioners recovered a thirty-five percent premium on what would remain
the largest appraisal claim in history until the Dell case in 2013. The
successful result in Transkaryotic,though it was partially concealed, might
in fact be a major part of what has sparked interest in appraisal.
III. DOES APPRAISAL

TARGET

THE RIGHT TRANSACTIONS?

Given the increasing incidence of appraisal litigation, and the sharply
increasing amounts at stake, examining the policy implications of
appraisal becomes a matter of some urgency. This Part and the next begin
this examination. We hypothesize that the structure of appraisal
litigation-which provides strong incentives for stockholders but not their
attorneys-ought to lead to litigation that bears markers of litigation merit.
In our empirical analysis, we find strong evidence in favor of this
hypothesis. Appraisal petitioners target deals where the merger premium is
low and where controlling stockholders are taking the company private.

113.

See Geis, supra note 34, at 1639-40 (2011) ("[D]espite the favorable summary judgment

ruling, petitioners in Transkaryotic eventually settled their claim for the initial $37 merger
consideration (plus interest), thereby throwing their claims of purported price inadequacy into
question."). See also Weiss, supra note 87 ("The case was eventually settled for $37 a share, the same

price paid in the merger, plus interest.").
114. See Shire Plc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2009) (disclosing "interest" of $147.6
million on a "settlement" of $419.9 million).
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A. The Unique Structure ofAppraisal Litigation
At least superficially, there is some reason to fear that appraisal
litigation-as a species of shareholder litigation-will share some of the
well-known pathologies of shareholder litigation. In other types of
shareholder litigation-like derivative suits or class actions alleging
violations of fiduciary duties in mergers-the actual plaintiff is largely
irrelevant. The plaintiffs' attorneys face all of the meaningful incentives in
such litigation, 115 and the agency problem between the attorneys and the
class of shareholders can oftentimes be severe.' 16 Plaintiffs in shareholder
litigation generally have only nominal control over their attorneys,' 17 and
the attorneys typically have de facto control over all litigation decisions,
including the decision to settle and the terms on which the settlement will
take place. The danger, then, is that attorneys will (1) bring nonmeritorious claims in hopes of settling quickly for a generous award of
fees-essentially a nuisance payment-and (2) settle meritorious claims
for less than the discounted settlement value because they can be bought
off by the defendants in settlement. Both outcomes are bad for
shareholders, and potentially for allocative efficiency. As a result, a large
literature exists questioning the extent to which the merits matter in
shareholder actions." 8
Most recently and most relevantly, we performed a study assessing the
merits of fiduciary duty class actions challenging merger transactions. 11 9
In a merger transaction, the chief concern to shareholders will generally be
the amount of the merger consideration.1 20 If the merits mattered in merger
litigation, we would expect there to be an inverse relationship between the

115.

See, e.g., Brian J.M. Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and Adoption of the

Exclusive Forum Provision, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 151 (2010) ("This type of litigation is highly
susceptible to agency costs because the interests of counsel will not always align with the interests of
their purported clients, the shareholders."); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 77, at 148 ("[T]he
entrepreneurial attorney's interests can diverge from those of the clients. If class counsel have
tremendous discretion to run the litigation, they may do so in a manner that maximizes their benefit,
even at the expense of the interests of their putative clients.").
116. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation: Balancing Fairness

and Efficiency, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1987) ("It is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest
between attorney and client can arise in class action litigation. In the language of economics, this is an

agency cost' problem.") (footnote omitted).
117. See id. at 884-86.
118.

For summaries of this voluminous literature, see Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities

Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465 (2004); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintifs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV.

1587 (2006); Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.
119. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.
120. See id. at 854.
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size of the merger premium and the likelihood of a class action being
filed.121 In fact, we found that there was only a very weak correlation
between the merger premium 2 2 and the likelihood of a fiduciary duty class
action.1 2 3 Instead, the strongest predictor of a fiduciary duty class action
was the deal size,1 24 suggesting that plaintiffs' attorneys are primarily
seeking to maximize the nuisance value of suits by going after deep
pockets and large transactions.1 2 5
If a similar dynamic were at work in appraisal litigation-which, of
course, also targets merger transactions-the increase in appraisal activity
would be cause for alarm. The structure of appraisal litigation, however, is
such that this is far less likely than for other forms of shareholder
litigation. Two features distinguish appraisal. First, as detailed above,
there are no class claims in appraisal.1 26 This means that an attorney
cannot make an arrangement with a small shareholder (one who owns a
single share, at the extreme) and seek to represent the entire class of
shareholders.1 27 It also means that the potential recovery is limited by the
size of the plaintiffs holdings. In addition, the presence of a genuine
plaintiff with a meaningful economic stake makes a collusive settlement
between the petitioner's attorney and the defendant corporation

121. Seeid at 835.
122. In assessing the size of the merger premium, we controlled for deal size, industry, and year of
the transaction. Id. at 872.

123. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15, at 877
124. Id. at 874.
125. Id. at 836.
126. See, e.g., Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 260 n.10 (Del. 1995)
("In an appraisal proceeding, however, shareholders enter the appraisal class by complying with the
statutory formalities required to perfect their appraisal rights. Thus, shareholders seeking appraisal 'opt
in' to a class, invariably before suit is even filed, rather than 'opt out."'); 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, at 267 n.6 ("[T]he appraisal remedy differs from the procedural rules
applicable to the class action, which assume that investors who do not 'opt out' desire to be
represented."); Aronstam, Balotti, & Rehbock, supra note 45, at 547 ("[T]he appraisal statute creates
an "opt-in" class for minority shareholders as opposed to the "opt-out" default mechanism of class

action lawsuits. Thus, only shareholders specifically electing to opt in will be able to benefit from a

judicial determination diverging from the corporation's initial valuation.") (footnotes omitted);
Thompson, supra note 31, at 41 ("No provision is made for a class action or other means that would
permit shareholders in a common situation to share an attomey and other expenses of litigation
easily.") (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Fried & Ganor, supra note 45, at 1004 n.105 ("In Delaware,

shareholders seeking appraisal are barred from using class action suits. Because each shareholder must
pursue his own individual claim, shareholders lose the important economic benefits of class actions,

which spread the costs of litigation and facilitate contingency financing.").
127. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3

(1991) ("[P]laintiffs' class and derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a
substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary control over all important

decisions in the lawsuit.").
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impossible.1 28 Second, Delaware's appraisal statute does not provide for
the allocation of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees to the defendant. As a result, the
attorney's only route to a fee is, again, through an actual plaintiff.1 29
Furthermore, the sole issue at stake in an appraisal action is the fair
value of the plaintiffs shares. This distinction is crucial for at least two
reasons. First, the single-issue nature of the claim precludes the typical
shareholder litigation phenomenon of collusive "disclosure only"
settlements whereby the defendants pay a sizeable cash fee to the
plaintiffs' attorneys, while providing only non-monetary window dressing
to the shareholders themselves. 130 An appraisal case can only settle for
cash. Second, the narrow focus of appraisal litigation reduces the nuisance
value of an appraisal petition. Nuisance suits may be profitable whenever
defendants are risk-averse or face asymmetric litigation costs.1 3 1 While

128. See id. at 5 ("The named plaintiff [in a fiduciary class action] does little-indeed, usually
does nothing-to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that representation is competent and zealous,
or to align the interests of the attorney with those of the class or corporation.").
129. The Delaware appraisal statute envisions two types of litigation expenses: 1) the court costs

of the proceeding itself, including the cost of a court-appointed appraiser; and 2) attorney and expert
witness fees. The statute provides that the costs of the proceeding may be allocated to the parties as
determined by the court, but "makes no mention of judicial discretion to allocate one party's expert
and attorney expenses to its opponent." Siegel, supra note 50, at 241.
The Delaware courts customarily allocate court costs to the defendant absent bad faith on the part

of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 77 (Del. 1950) (same); Meade v.
Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 58 A.2d 415, 418 (Del. 1948) (allocating court costs to the defendant
absent bad faith); In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., No. 8080, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *103 (Del.
Ch. Dec. I1, 1990) (citing section 262(j) and assessing court costs against the defendant); Lehman v.
Nat'l Union Electric Co., No. 4964, 1980 Del. Ch. LEXIS 490, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 1980)
(finding that the plaintiffs good faith belief in the merits of his claim, even though unreasonable, was
enough to justify allocating court costs to the defendant). The Delaware courts have, however,
interpreted the statute to not allow the shifting of the plaintiffs attorney and expert witness fees to the

defendants under most circumstances. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 301
(Del. 1996) ("In the absence of an equitable exception, the plaintiff in an appraisal proceeding should
bear the burden of paying its own expert witnesses and attorneys."); Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc.,

1989 WL 17438, at *1109-10 (Del. Ch. 1989) ("By its own terms the [appraisal] statute does not
authorize the Court to tax a petitioning stockholder's attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses
against the surviving corporation. Those expenses are recoverable only by a pro rata apportionment
against the value of the shares entitled to an appraisal.") (citation omitted). The Delaware courts have

recognized an equitable exception to the rule that the plaintiff always bears her own attorney's and
expert's fees, however, this exception is narrow, and will not apply in the run of cases. Mary Siegel
describes Delaware courts as giving the equitable exception a "narrow construction," applying "upon

evidence of a party's egregious conduct." Siegel, supra note 50, at 241-42. We have located only one
appraisal case where the court applied the equitable exception to assign the plaintiffs attorney and
expert costs to the defendant. See Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Inc. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206,
228-29 (Del. 2005) (finding that the destruction of evidence, failure to respond to discovery request,
use of "fatally flawed" expert testimony, and the CEO's lying under oath justified allocating all of the
plaintiffs costs to the defendant).
130. See supra note 5.

131. As Janet Cooper Alexander summarized the economic arguments, "high litigation costs and
uncertainty about trial outcomes can lead to the settlement of frivolous suits." Janet Cooper Alexander,
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calculating fair value is far from easy, the single-issue nature of the claim
renders the proceeding relatively straightforward, and the scope of
discovery is limited to materials bearing on the company's value. To be
sure, where one party seeks to use the merger price itself as evidence of
fair value, somewhat more sweeping discovery into the process that led to
that price may be necessary. But compared to other forms of shareholder
litigation, the proceeding is relatively simple and thus inexpensive,
reducing the nuisance value of a claim.' 3 2
The litigation risk faced by the parties is also far more symmetric in
appraisal litigation than in other forms of shareholder litigation. Aggregate
shareholder litigation creates the possibility of catastrophic damages or an
injunction. Damages in appraisal are limited to the fair value of the actual
petitioner's shares. Moreover, the petitioner has real skin in the game, as
well. Not only may filing a petition entail substantial upfront cost, courts
in appraisal actions can-and occasionally dol 33 -determine the fair value
of the plaintiffs shares to be less than the merger consideration.'13 4 In
contrast, fiduciary duty class action plaintiffs have typically already
received the merger consideration and face no financial downside, giving

Do The Merits Matter?, 43 STAN. L. REV. at 502 n.10 (1991). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing
Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, J. LEGAL. STUD. 437 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the
PrivateAttorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L.
REv. 215 (1983); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L.

REv. 533 (1997); D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Broughtfor Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
132. There is also reason to believe that litigation costs will be more symmetric, greatly reducing
the in terrorem value of an appraisal petition. The open-ended nature and scienter aspects of fraud or

fiduciary duty claims makes it easy for plaintiffs to justify sweeping discovery requests for, say, all emails from dozens of top executives. These requests impose crushing and asymmetric costs on

defendants, who may then find it cheaper to simply pay a nuisance settlement. Such "fishing
expeditions" will less often be justifiable in an appraisal proceeding, where the sole merits issue is the

fair value of the company. Likewise, the parties will generally face similar costs in hiring experts to
conduct valuations and testify at trial. The lack of aggregate litigation also reduces litigation cost
asymmetries in that plaintiffs are not able to spread costs across the class of all shareholders. See
Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.
133. Courts in Delaware do not treat the merger price as a floor in appraisal valuations. In our
examination of appraisal opinions, 5 of the 40 opinions (twelve-and-a-half percent) gave the appraisal

petitioners a lower price than they would have received in the merger. The lowest gave the petitioner
an award that was 19.8% lower than the merger price. Thus, while appraisal petitioners might face an
attractive expected return, it comes with considerable risk-both sides have something to lose. As
noted supra at 38, the appraisal petitioner essentially becomes an unsecured creditor of the acquirer,
with no set time frame for getting his money back and a substantial chance of ultimately being entitled
to less than he would have received in the merger.

134. See Siegel, supra note 50, at 104 ("[Slhareholders in appraisal actions risk the possibility of
receiving less than the transaction price.").
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fiduciary litigation a costless option value that is absent in appraisal
actions.135

Furthermore, the distorting effects of insurance play less of a role in
appraisal. For most types of shareholder litigation, the potential for a
nuisance settlement is heightened by the ubiquity of liability insurance for
directors and officers. Such insurance policies will pay some or all of the
costs of a settlement, so long as the defendants are not found culpable at
trial.1 3 6 As a result, defendants face a strong incentive to settle weak
claims rather than run a small risk of personal liability. In an appraisal
proceeding, any recovery simply comes from the acquirer, and the
culpability and personal liability of the target company's board are not at
issue.
In sum, the agency problem-ubiquitous in aggregate shareholder
litigation-is absent from appraisal litigation, and the parties to an
appraisal proceeding face far more symmetric costs and risks from
litigation, greatly reducing the in terroremvalue of nuisance suits. There is
thus strong reason to believe that appraisal litigation will be more
meritorious, on average, than other forms of shareholder litigation.' 37
B. An EmpiricalExaminationof the Merits ofAppraisalLitigation
In evaluating whether the merits matter, we seek to determine how
mergers are selected for appraisal litigation. Are plaintiffs targeting deals
where there is reason to believe the merger consideration was inadequate?
Or are they simply seeking deep pockets that may be willing to settle for

135.

Id.

136. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 131, at 550 (arguing that "[t]he existence and operation of
insurance and indemnification may be the most important factor in creating a system of settlements
that do not reflect the merits."); Choi, supra note 118, at 1469 (noting that "many companies have

liability insurance policies for their directors and officers, many of which will not pay if the directors
or officers are found culpable at trial ... Rather than face this prospect (even if unlikely), directors and
officers will often settle, relying on the [D&O] liability insurers to pay most, if not all, of the
settlement award."); Roberta Romano, The ShareholderSuit: Litigation Without Foundation?,7 J. L.

ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991) ("[A]ll states permit corporations to purchase D&O insurance for their
executives, and policies can cover losses that cannot be indemnified. Policies routinely exempt losses
from adjudication of dishonesty, but if a claim is settled, courts prohibit insurers from seeking an

adjudication of guilt and thereby avoiding the claim's payment."); see also Securities Litigation
Reform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Telecomm. Fin. of the Comm. on Energy Commerce, 103d

Cong. 1 (1994) (statement of Vincent E. O'Brien) (claiming that 96% of securities class action
settlements are within the D&O insurance coverage limits, with the insurance usually the lone source
of the settlement proceeds).
137. The reasons for thinking the merits will matter in appraisal are, in fact, so strong that we used

appraisal litigation as a benchmark of merit against which to contrast apparently non-merits-related
fiduciary duty challenges to merger transactions. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.
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nuisance value? Davidoff and Cain, for example, find that nearly 95% of
all mergers with a deal size greater than $100 million result in some form
of shareholder litigation.138
If this dynamic were also at work in appraisal actions, we would expect
to see large merger transactions to be disproportionately targeted for
appraisal petitions, and for the adequacy of the merger price to have little
or no predictive power.13 9 Until recently, an empirical investigation of this
question has been impossible, due to a lack of data on the characteristics
of appraisal litigation. 14 0 Using our hand-collected data set, 14 1 however, it
is possible to examine the selection of merger transactions by appraisal
petitioners.
Out of 1168 appraisal-eligible transactions for which litigation data
was available, 683 attracted at least one fiduciary class action.1 42 By
contrast, only 87 transactions involved a counseled appraisal petition, with
an additional seven transactions attracting only pro se petitions. 14 3 Table 2
presents the general pattern of litigation.

138. Davidoff and Cain, for example, find that nearly all mergers with a deal size greater than
$100 million result in some form of shareholder litigation. See Cain & Davidoff, supra note 107
(finding that 92% of all transactions with a value greater than $100 million experienced litigation in

2012). Similarly, Curtis and Morley recently studied excessive-fee litigation in the mutual fund
industry. See Quinn Curtis & John Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Excessive Fee
Litigation: Do the Merits Matter? (working paper) (2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-

1852652. They found that the size of the fee charged by a mutual fund was not a statistically
significant predictor of the incidence of litigation. The single strongest predictor was simply the value
of the assets under management of the relevant mutual fund family-large, rich fund families attract
litigation. They interpret this result to suggest that the filing of excessive-fee litigation is largely driven

by the search for deep pockets, rather than by the charging high fees. Id.
139. There may be some reason to expect larger deals to attract more appraisal action, in that a
larger corporation is likely to have more minority shareholders with a large enough stake to potentially

justify the costs of an appraisal action. Nonetheless, we would expect the size of the merger premium
to be the most predictive single variable.
140. A version of some of the findings presented here are also presented in Korsmo & Myers,
supra note 14.
141. We compiled a set of transactions from the Thomson One database of merger transactions

with Delaware-incorporated, public company targets that closed between 2004 and the end of 2013, a
period corresponding to the appraisal cases we collected from the Delaware dockets. We restricted our
sample of transactions to those where appraisal was available. For this same universe of transactions,

we also collected data on the incidence of classic fiduciary class action litigation and the outcomes of
that litigation. Our resulting dataset thus includes all transactions involving public corporations
incorporated in Delaware for which a shareholder could have mounted a fiduciary challenge, an

appraisal proceeding, or both. For each transaction, we then determined whether shareholders pursued
either or both. This allows us to compare the selection of merger transactions for challenge via

different types of shareholder litigation. For a more complete description of the data on fiduciary duty
class actions, see Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.
142. Id. at 868.
143. Id.
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TABLE 2
INCIDENCE OF FIDUCIARY CLAIMS AND APPRAISAL CLAIMS

Fiduciaryclass action

E

No

Yes

Total

No

470

612

1082

Yes

15

71

86

485

683

1168

Total

A major difficulty in determining whether the merits matter in much
shareholder litigation-involving issues of scienter and breach of fiduciary
duty, for example-is that the merits are generally not easy to evaluate.
The only issue in an appraisal action, however, is the fair value of the
plaintiffs' shares, and the sole remedy is accordingly very
straightforward-cash in exchange for the shares.'" As we have argued
elsewhere,1 45 per share cash recovery is likely to be the only truly
meaningful relief-and thus the best measure of the merits-even in nonappraisal merger litigation. This simplicity offers a rare opportunity to
assess the merits of a claim. The merits of appraisal actions are easy to
perceive. 46
In evaluating how appraisal petitioners select disputes for litigation, we
examined two principal metrics. The first represents the size of the
transaction,1 47 which we do not consider directly relevant to the merits.

144. See supra note 63.
145. See Korsmo and Myers, supra note 15.
146. The notion of "merit" or "frivolousness" in litigation is more slippery than it may first
appear. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529-33 (1997)
(considering and rejecting a number of common definitions of "frivolous litigation"). We will speak,
somewhat loosely, of a suit being "merits-related" when either the decision to bring the suit or the
disposition of the suit are more related to the expected damages at trial than to other factors, such as
the ability to inflict litigation costs on the defendant and thus extract a settlement. An advantage of the
approach used here is that we measure the relative influence of merit-related variables and non-merit
related variables on the decision to bring suit, rather than arbitrarily defining some cut-off for
"frivolous" litigation (i.e., all suits settled in less than one year; all suits settled for less than $2
million). See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.
147. Ideally, we would use the size of the acquiring firm, rather than that of the target firm, as the
measure of "deep pockets." It is, after all, the acquiring firm that will pay any judgment.
Unfortunately, using the size of the acquiring firm is not possible. Many of the acquiring firms are not
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The second represents the adequacy of the merger consideration, which is
relevant to the merits. We examine these two metrics below. A large
merger premium should suggest a weak appraisal claim and a small
merger premium should suggest a strong merger claim, all else being
equal. By contrast, we would expect there to be little or no relationship
48
between the sheer size of a transaction and the merit of a claim.1
1. The Unimportanceof TransactionSize
To examine the effect of deal size on the likelihood of appraisal, we
used two measures of the value of the transaction: (1) "enterprise value"
(the total merger consideration); and (2) "equity value" (the amount of
merger consideration allocated to the shareholders). Both are calculated in
constant 2013 dollars. Table 3 reports the mean and median sizes of both
measures of transaction size across various categories of transactions.
publicly traded, and it is often not possible to obtain reliable data about private acquirers. Nor is it
possible to simply restrict our analysis to petitions where the acquirer is public and reliable data is
available, as this would lead to a highly skewed sample. Private acquirers tend to disproportionately

include financial buyers, such as private equity firms, where there are unlikely to be large synergistic
values. As a result, excluding non-public acquirers would skew our sample toward strategic mergers
with potentially large synergies. Because synergistic values are excluded from the calculation of fair

value, such transactions are likely to pose abnormally high risk to would-be appraisal petitioners. See,
e.g., In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 74 (Del. Ch. 2013) (noting that in appraisal,
valuations must "back out any synergies"); Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, *3 (Del.
Ch. 2012) ("Determining the value of a 'going concern' requires the Court to exclude and synergistic
value. . .. "); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch.
2004) ("[T]his court must endeavor to exclude from any appraisal award the amount of any value that

the selling company's shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject
company, not as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from which
synergistic gains can be extracted.").

Transaction size thus acts as a proxy for acquirer size. While a large firm can acquire a small firm,
a small firm will generally not acquire a large firm. We therefore expect that transaction size will be
strongly correlated with acquirer size. To test this intuition, we examined the transactions for which

the size of the acquirer was available, and found a positive, statistically significant relationship
between transaction size and acquirer size. See Korsmo & Myers, supranote 15, at 884.

148. While transaction size should not be directly related to the chance of success on the meritsit is likely to be at least somewhat related to the expected recovery at trial in a fiduciary class action,
which is related to the "merits," as we use the term. See supra note 147. Transaction size might be at

least weakly related to the merits in class actions in that it will be correlated to the size of the class and
thus the potential damages at trial. In an appraisal claim, however, any relationship should be weaker
still. Because there is no class in appraisal, the potential damages at trial are limited by the number of
shares owned by the petitioner, not the size of the transaction. The only potential merit-related
relationship between transaction size and the incidence of appraisal is that larger transactions may

have more shareholders with a large enough position to make appraisal worthwhile. See J. Travis
Laster, The Appraisal Remedy in Third Party Deals, 18 INSIGHTS, Apr. 2004, at 4 (suggesting a
$500,000 threshold for a worthwhile appraisal claim-$620,000 adjusted for inflation to 2013 dollars).
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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF TRANSACTION SIZE IN APPRAISAL CASES,
IN MILLIONS OF 2013 DOLLARS

No appraisal
All appraisal
Pro se appraisal
Counseled appraisal

Equity value
mean
median

Enterprisevalue
mean
median

$1918.6
2,942.5
21,086.9
1465.6

$2,694.3
3,042.9
20,993.4
1581.8

$457.8
381.6
1344.0
446.3

$482.7
555.7
1303.7
505.5

Transactions attracting appraisal are larger, on both measures of size,
than transactions not attracting appraisal. 149 When we consider only those
appraisal actions filed by plaintiffs represented by counsel, however, the
difference in deal size disappears altogether. Indeed, transactions attracting
counseled appraisal actions are actually smaller than the deals that did not
generate a counseled appraisal action.'" 0
The focus of our analysis is on the more economically significant
counseled appraisal petitions, which are far more likely to be sensitive to
the incentive structure created by legal rules. For counseled petitions, the
difference in transaction size between deals that attracted appraisal
petitions and those that did not is not statistically significant, measured
either in constant dollars or in the logarithm of constant dollars. This lack
of a strong relationship between transaction size and counseled appraisal
can be seen visually. Figure 7 shows a kernel density plot of transactions
that attracted counseled appraisal petitions in gray and those transactions
that did not in black.

149. None of these differences in size are statistically significant at any conventional level.
150. The difference in transaction size between transactions with counseled petitions and pro se
petitions is significant at least at the five-percent level, across both measures of size and also when
looking at log dollars. We speculate that large deals attract greater publicity, thus coming to the
attention of small shareholders who may not act as strictly rational economic actors.
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FIGURE 7
DENSITY PLOT OF TRANSACTIONS ATTRACTING COUNSELED APPRAISAL
PETITION (GRAY), BY THE LOGARITHM OF EQUITY SIZE

Equity Value: Appraisal
c'!

Lo

0

5

Log equity value

10

15

Figure 7 illustrates that those transactions that attracted counseled
appraisal petitions are nearly identical in equity value to those that did not.
A plot using enterprise value rather than equity value looks similar.
2. The Importance of the Merger Price
We also examined the merger premium, which we obtained from the
Thomson One merger database.'"' The raw size of the merger premium for
any given deal is, however, not a particularly satisfactory measure of the
adequacy of the merger consideration (and, thus, the merits of the claim).
Average merger premia vary widely across industries and across time,
with average premia being much higher in the hot deal market of 2007, for
example, than in the cold market of 2009. Furthermore, as we might

151. In a recent paper, Quinn Curtis and John Morley exploit a similar feature of mutual fund
excessive fee litigation to evaluate whether the merits matter in such cases. In such cases, the only
issue is the appropriateness of the funds' fees, which are directly observable and comparable. See
Curtis & Morley, supra note 138. They find that the strongest predictor of whether a mutual fund
would be targeted by such a claim was not the size of the fees charged, but rather the size of the assets
under management by the targeted fund's family. They suggest that this may indicate that such
litigation is triggered less by a meritorious claim, and more by the presence of deep pockets. See id.
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expect, larger deals tend to involve smaller premia as measured in
percentage terms.
In order to take these factors into account, we computed an "expected"
merger premium based on the most salient variables: the size of the target
company,1 52 the year of the transaction, and the target company's industry.
We then use the residual premium-the difference between the expected
premium and the actual premium-as our proxy for the merits of the
underlying legal claim.' 5 3 The size of the residual premium should be
negatively correlated with the merits of a claim: a positive residual
premium implies a weaker claim, while a large negative residual premium
ought to suggest a stronger claim, all else being equal.
We computed residual premia based on three measures of actual
premium: the one-day premium, the one-week premium, and the fourweek premium. We were able to determine these figures for 88 deals that
attracted appraisal actions-6 pro se and 82 counseled-and 1014 deals
that did not. Across all three measures, we find that the deals that attracted
appraisal actions have lower residual premia, as shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF MERGER PREMIA RESIDUALS IN APPRAISAL CASES

1-day premium
mean

No appraisal
All appraisal
Pro se appraisal
Counseled appraisal

2.1%
-15.0%
-9.5
-15.4

median

-3.2%
-16.0
-2.0
-16.1

1-week premium
mean

2.8%
-15.7
-11.9
-16.0

median

-2.9%
-12.7
-0.3
-14.0

4-week premium
mean

2.9%
-18.4
-12.1
-18.9

median

-2.9%
-20.6
-3.0
-21.3

The appraisal petitions target deals with highly negative residual
premia, and the differences in residual premia between transactions with
appraisal and those without are all statistically significant beyond the 1%
level. A kernel density plot showing the likelihood of attracting counseled

152. In order to avoid circularity, we use the market value of the target company four weeks prior
to the merger announcement as the measure of the target's size. By using this measure, we avoid the

problem of having the target company's market value being distorted by the proposed terms of the
merger.

153. The procedure used here is similar to that employed by Morley and Curtis in their analysis of
excessive fee litigation targeting mutual funds. See Morley & Curtis, supra note 138. Rather than
simply using the raw size of the fee charged by the relevant mutual fund as their measure of merit for
excessive fee litigation, they first calculate an average fee for funds with a similar investment style,
and then subtract that average from the individual fund's actual fee. The result is what they call the
"Style-Demeaned Expense Ratio." See id. at 20.
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appraisal petitions by the four-week residual premium dramatically
illustrates the difference.
FIGURE 8
TRANSACTION PREMIA RESIDUALS FOR TRANSACTIONS WITH COUNSELED
APPRAISAL (GRAY), BY FOUR-WEEK RESIDUAL PREMIA

4-Week Residual: Appraisal

I

I

0
4-week premium residual

.5

The gray line plots the residual premia for transactions that attracted a
counseled appraisal petition, while the black line shows the same for
transactions not attracting counseled petitions. The consistent pattern
across the three measures is that appraisal litigation involves transactions
with strongly negative residual premia.
As hypothesized, appraisal petitioners appear to target transactions
with, all else equal, lower merger premia. While we lack an exogenous
shock that would allow us to draw more firm causal inferences, the result
certainly suggests that appraisal petitions are being brought with due
regard to the merits. Furthermore, counseled appraisal petitioners do not
appear to simply target large transactions, suggesting they are not merely
looking for deep pockets and nuisance-value settlements.
We use two other methods of examining more searchingly the
empirical determinants of appraisal proceedings. The first is to construct a
logistic regression model, identifying the factors that predict whether or
not a transaction will face an appraisal petition. Our dependent variable is
a dummy that takes the value of I if the transaction faced a counselled
appraisal petition and 0 otherwise. Our transaction dataset again includes
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93 transactions that attracted at least one appraisal petition, 86 of which
were counseled. We use as independent variables the log of transaction
value, the residual premium, and variables for going private transactions
and financial buyers. Our results appear in Panel A in the Appendix.
Under all specifications, our measures of deal premium residual are
strongly significant, and the sign of the coefficient is always negative,
meaning that appraisal petitioners are more likely to target deals with
lower merger premia. In addition, the going private variable is positive and
strongly significant in all specifications, suggesting appraisal petitioners
target going private transactions, where conflicts of interest are most likely
to be acute. We estimate the effects of these variables on the incidence of
appraisal litigation. A one standard deviation decrease in the one-week
residual premium implies an increase of between 3.3% and 8.8% in the
predicted probability of an appraisal petition. Similarly, a going-private
transaction implies an increase in the likelihood of a petition of between
2.2% and 14.3%. All of the other variables-including, notably,
transaction size-have no impact on the likelihood of an appraisal petition
that is statistically distinguishable from zero.
Our second empirical approach goes beyond treating appraisal as a
binary yes-or-no question. Instead, we analyze how many shares actually
sought appraisal. For each transaction, we computed the percentage of
equity value that sought appraisal, rounding to the nearest percentage
integer. Of the 1168 appraisal eligible transactions, 48 had 1% or more of
shareholders seek appraisal. The firms in each transaction that sought
appraisal are shown in the following table:
Percentage of shareholders seeking appraisal, by transactions
Percentageof shareholdersseeking appraisal
Firms
(roundedto nearest integer)
0
1120
1
20
2
4
3
6
4
2
5
4
6
2
7
1
8
3
9
I
11
1
12
1
15
1
17
1
31
1
Total
1168
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We used these numbers as our dependent variables for a poisson
regression, using the same independent variables noted above. The results
of this regression appear in Panel B of the Appendix. As in our logistic
regressions, the sign of the coefficient here for premium is negative under
all specifications, and in each case it is statistically significant at the 1%
level. Transaction size is statistically significant only under some
specifications, and only when equity value is the measure of transaction
size. While this suggests some role for transaction size, it appears to be a
small one. A one standard deviation reduction in the one-day premium
residual, for example, has an effect ten times as strong on the percentage
of shares seeking appraisal as a one standard deviation increase in equity
value. In sum, not only was an appraisal petition more likely to be filed as
the residual premium decreased, but the percentage of shares seeking
appraisal also tended to go up as the residual premium became more
negative. By contrast, the incidence of appraisal was not predicted by the
size of the transaction, and the intensity was only weakly affected.
As we demonstrate above, however, appraisal activity has increased
dramatically in recent years. A natural question, then, is whether the
metrics of litigation merit also changed dramatically as appraisal became
more widespread in recent years. To test this possibility, we performed
separate analyses restricted to the approximately 300 transactions that
closed from 2011 through 2013, and found that our results did not change.
All of the measures of residual premium still have a negative and
statistically significant relationship on the incidence of appraisal: it is still
the case that if the premium is lower, appraisal is more likely. Similarly,
appraisal is still more likely in the presence of a going-private transaction.
Taken together, these results suggest that the merits do tend to matter
in appraisal litigation, and that the rise of litigation arbitrage has not
changed this picture. This stands in contrast to the fiduciary class action
litigation involving the same universe of appraisal-eligible mergers. In
another paper, we show that for fiduciary class actions, deal size is the
strongest predictor of litigation, with far greater predictive power than the
size of the merger premium. 15 4 While these results do not prove that
appraisal arbitrage is a positive development, it does at least suggest that
appraisal is not simply a new frontier of nuisance litigation. The policy
implications of these findings are developed in the next two Parts.

154. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.
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IV. THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY AND APPRAISAL
ARBITRAGE

Given the sharp increase in appraisal litigation and the rise of appraisal
arbitrage, it is heartening to see that the merits matter in the decision to
bring an appraisal petition and that petitioners are targeting deals where
there is reason to think the merger consideration is inadequate. This
suggests that appraisal is working, at least in some respects, in a socially
useful way. At the very least, our findings allay the fear that-as one
commentator has colorfully put it-appraisal will simply become "a backend cesspool for strike suits."155 Nonetheless, appraisal defendants have
attempted to paint the new brand of appraisal arbitrage as an ominous and
unwelcome "abuse" that courts and policymakers should frown upon.156
Thus, it is worth considering more broadly the social utility of the
appraisal arbitrage.
The potentially positive role for appraisal is relatively straightforward.
Just as the market for corporate control can serve as a check on agency
costs from managerial shirking,157 appraisal rights can serve as a back-end
check on abuses by corporate managers, controlling shareholders, or other
insiders in merger transactions.
The idea of a market for corporate control as a governance mechanism
is well-known. 158 If a firm's managers shirk or otherwise mismanage the
firm badly enough, the firm's stock will go down in price. If the price falls
enough, outside arbitrageurs can buy a controlling stake in the firm at the
depressed price, replace the old management with competent new
managers, and profit from the subsequent increase in stock price.
Appreciating the risk that they could be ousted in such a fashion, managers
have an incentive to avoid shirking in the first place. The substantial
transaction costs involved in a takeover often render it a governance

155. Geis, supra note 34, at 1664.
156. See supra note 24.
157. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
73-75 (2008).
158. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 112 (1996); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1173-74 (1981);
Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The
Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51 (1988); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S.
Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 29-31
(1983); Jonathan R. Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs and Property Rights in Corporate Assets, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 85, 96-98 (1990); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. I10, 112-13 (1965).
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mechanism of last resort, but the possibility nonetheless serves as an
important market check on managerial abuse and neglect.
Similarly, a robust market for appraisal arbitrage could serve as an
effective back-end market check on expropriation from minority
shareholders in merger transactions. When a merger takes place at a fair
price, appraisal arbitrage will not be attractive to outside investors on the
merits. If, however, a merger is agreed to at a price far enough below fair
value-measured in conventional financial terms-appraisal arbitrageurs
will have an incentive to accumulate a position and seek appraisal. In so
doing, the arbitrageur will serve as a check on low-ball merger agreements
and freeze-outs.1 5 9
Protecting minority shareholders is good not only for minority
shareholders, but also-in the long run-for controlling shareholders,
entrepreneurs, and the economy at large. To the extent that minority
shareholders are protected against mistreatment, they will be willing to
pay more for their shares in the first place. A governance mechanism that
reduces the risk of expropriation faced by minority shareholders will thus
reduce the cost of accessing equity capital for companies and increase the
60
allocative efficiency of capital markets as a whole.'
Crucially, however, for appraisal to act as an effective back-end check
on low mergers, a deep and active appraisal arbitrage market is necessary.
In the absence of robust appraisal arbitrage, collective action and freeriding problems would likely render the threat of appraisal proceedings an
ineffective deterrent to wrongdoing. By buying up large positions after the
announcement of a transaction, thus allowing them to spread the fixed
costs of bringing an appraisal claim over a broad share base, arbitrageurs
can bring meritorious claims that would otherwise be cost-prohibitive for
dispersed minority shareholders. Arbitrageurs can also bring their
expertise as repeat players to bear to further reduce the frictions that might
otherwise prevent appraisal from being an effective governance
mechanism. Appraisal arbitrage thus solves the same collective action

159. Geis, supra note 34, at 1662 ("[J]ust like the traditional market for corporate control dampens
the shareholder-manager agency cost problem, a robust back-end market for appraisal rights might
protect against the majority shareholder expropriation problem.").

160. See generally Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 875, 880; Ralph K. Winter, State Law, ShareholderProtection, and the Theory of the

Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD. 251 (1977). See also Geis, supra note 34, at 1657 ("[A]n overly
permissive freezeout regime will theoretically reduce the market value of firms that have controlling
shareholders. Potential investors are haunted by the constant fear of an abusive freezeout. That risk
should, in turn, depress the upfront price that investors are willing to pay for stock.") (footnote
omitted).
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problems that aggregate litigation seeks to solve, but without generating a
serious agency problem in the process.
Potential criticisms of appraisal arbitrage, while superficially plausible,
are either inconsistent with the empirical evidence or otherwise fail to
withstand scrutiny. The most basic fear, of course, is that appraisal
arbitrage will-like other forms of shareholder litigation-turn into a
swamp of nuisance litigation, with the possible twist that the main
beneficiaries are opportunistic financiers rather than opportunistic
attorneys. So far, at least,' 61 the empirical evidence provides no support for
this fear.1 62
A related but somewhat more sophisticated concern is that acquirers
will come to view the risk of appraisal as essentially a tax that raises the
costs of acquiring a company, and reduce the amount they are willing to
bid for the company accordingly. As a result, minority shareholders who
do not seek appraisal would receive less than they would have in a world
with no appraisal. The net result would be a kind of price discrimination:
unsophisticated or unmotivated shareholders would receive the lower deal
price, while sophisticated and motivated shareholders who seek appraisal
would receive a somewhat higher price. In such a world, society as a
whole would come out worse, net of transaction costs. 6 3

This argument neglects two important considerations, however. First,
acquirers have it in their power to render the expected cost of any
"appraisal tax" negligible. As an initial matter, if they simply price the
deal fairly, such that the cost of pursuing appraisal is unlikely to be
justified by the potential recovery at trial, acquirers will face only nuisance
suits, which-as explained above'64-appear to be unlikely. Acquirers
also can protect themselves contractually by including in the merger
agreement a provision allowing them to terminate the agreement if more
than a certain number of shares demand appraisal. 6 1
Second, and perhaps more relevant, any substantial price
discrimination effect can only persist in the absence of a developed
appraisal arbitrage market. In a developed appraisal market, appraisal
arbitrageurs will seek to accumulate a position in the target company
following the announcement of a transaction, and will continue to

161. We expect to continue to collect data on appraisal litigation, and update our analysis
annually.

162. See supra Part II.B.
163. A version of this argument was made by Mahoney and Weinstein in the 1990s. See Mahoney
& Weinstein, supranote 5, at 242.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 125-36.

165. See id. at 242.
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purchase shares until the market price has been driven to the risk-adjusted
expected present value of an appraisal claim. Indeed, the threat of this
phenomenon could operate as an ex ante price floor in merger
negotiations.
Minority shareholders would thus share in the expected gains from
66
appraisal without having to file a petition themselves,' just as the
benefits from the market for corporate control accrue to ordinary
shareholders. Indeed, minority shareholders could be better off by sharing
in these gains than if they had sought appraisal themselves because
professional arbitrageurs, as sophisticated repeat players, may be able to
reduce overall costs in pressing claims or achieve better results in
appraisal than individual investors could on their own.
Another criticism that might be made of appraisal is that the remedy is
ultimately circular.' 67 If the merger price is "low" in a transaction, then the
acquirer is capturing excess value and the target is leaving value on the
table. Although this phenomenon may sound worrisome at first,
shareholders who are diversified across potential acquirers and potential
targets would not actually end up harmed by it. A diversified stockholder
could expect to profit as much as she suffers from any mispricing of
mergers-sometimes suffering from a lowball merger price on the target
side, and sometimes gaining a windfall on the acquirer side. As such, any
attempt to reallocate the merger proceeds would just shift value from her
left hand to her right, minus the costs of the proceeding itself. The costs of
such a system would thus function as pure deadweight loss.
The basic fault with this argument is that it wrongly assumes that a
public investor could achieve a portfolio that is sufficiently exposed to the
acquirers of public companies. In our data set, one-third of the transactions
involved an acquirer that was a private entity-a private equity fund, a
dedicated investment vehicle, or a closely-held corporation. When public
companies are sold to these entities at a discount, the value is captured
entirely by the private entity and completely lost to public stockholders.
Because they cannot generally invest in these types of vehicles, public
stockholders thus cannot diversify away the risk of mispricing in mergers.
166. In several of the cases involving repeat petitioners, we observed substantial trading above the
merger price following the announcement of the deal. It is possible that this trading represented more

traditional merger arbitrageurs speculating on the possibility of a topping bid, but it is also possible
that this represented appraisal arbitrageurs bidding up the price of shares and in so doing paying
existing minority shareholders a portion of the expected gain.
167. See Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, IntraportfolioLitigation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1679
(2011) (on circularity in the context of securities and corporate litigation).
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Thus, the circularity argument-potent for other forms of shareholder
litigation-does not apply to appraisal.
The most fundamental objection to appraisal is that the courts simply
are not equipped to perform accurate valuations.' 6 1 On this view, it is
unrealistic to expect legal proceedings to do a better job than competitive
markets at valuing companies. Allowing courts to declare the fair value of
a company where there has been no showing of any process-based
wrongdoing apparently flies in the face of the usual strong presumptionin Delaware, at least-that competitive markets are the best arbiters of
economic value. The valuations that courts derive in appraisal proceedings
have, on occasion, attracted ridicule from practitioners and academic
observers. Courts have sometimes awarded three or more times the merger
consideration to dissenting shareholders,' 69 leading commentators to decry
the "casino-like aspect of the appraisal process"170 and lament that courts'
"misunderstandings have led to windfalls for dissenting shareholders."' 7 1
There has been little systematic examination, however, of what courts
have done in appraisal cases, even in reported opinions.17 2
To get a sense of what a shareholder might reasonably expect in
appraisal, we analyzed data on all appraisal opinions between the
watershed case of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,'1 73 and roughly the beginning

168. On occasion, the judges of the Delaware Chancery Court have themselves expressed
frustration with their role. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG,
memo. Op. at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) ("I have commented elsewhere on the difficulties, if not
outright incongruities, of a law-trained judge determining fair value of a company in light of an

auction sale, aided by experts offering wildly different opinions on value."); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v.
CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013).
169. See, e.g., Borruso v. Communications Telesystems International, 753 A.2d 451 (Del. Ch.
1999) (awarding a 3027% premium to a dissenting stockholder of a private company).
170. James C. Morphy, Doing Away With Appraisalin Public Deals, 26 DEL. LAW. 30 (2008). See
&

also Michael P. Dooley, Rules, Standards, and the Model Business Corporation Act, 74 LAW
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 53 (2011) (noting that appraisal awards are sometimes "two to three times the

merger consideration, thereby turning appraisal into something of a lottery") (footnote omitted).
171. William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware
Courts' Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 845, 847 (2003).
172. Compare Feng Chen, Kenton K. Yee & Yong Keun Yoo, Robustness ofJudicial Decisions to
Valuation-Method Innovation:An ExploratoryEmpirical Study, 37 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 1094 (2010)
(purporting to examine appraisal cases but in fact mixes all sorts of judicial valuations beyond
appraisal), with Laster, supra note 133, at 29 (suggesting around 400% average return for appraisal

petitioners, which is consistent with our findings).
173. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Prior to Weinberger, Delaware courts-pursuant to statute-used
the so-called "Delaware Block Method" to value shares in an appraisal. Id. The Delaware Block
Method entirely eschewed forward-looking evaluations, focusing on trailing indicators like capitalized
trailing earnings, book value, and liquidation value of assets. See Piemonte v. New Boston Garden

Corp., 387 N.E. 2d 1145, 1148 (Mass. 1979) (detailing Delaware Block Method of valuation). In its
refusal to consider forward-looking projections, the Delaware Block Method came to be seen as out of
step with modern financial theory, and in the seminal 1983 decision in Weinberger v. UOP, the
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of our data set described above, during which time there were 44 reported
appraisal opinions in Delaware.1 74 Across 40 opinions that disclose both
(1) the merger consideration and (2) the final premium awarded in the
appraisal proceedings, the median award is a 50.2% premium over the
merger price. The mean award is 330% over the merger price, but this
statistic is heavily skewed by three very large awards of over 30 times the
merger consideration.175 The range from the 25th to the 75th percentile
was 8.0% to 149% premium over the merger consideration. Thus, judges
did not hesitate to award petitioners amounts in appraisal that were well
beyond the merger consideration. Of course, these cases are over ten years
old and involve mostly non-public companies, so they should be
interpreted with caution. One might question why, in many of these cases,
if these companies were truly as valuable as the courts found, a higher
bidder did not materialize.
We are not insensitive to this criticism, but there are reasons to think it
misses the mark. First, as an empirical matter, if courts were habitually
over-valuing shares in appraisal we would expect the pattern of appraisal
litigation to more closely resemble that of fiduciary duty class actions,
with petitions routinely filed without much regard for the merits. This is
not, in fact, what we observe. Appraisal activity is strongly associated with
abnormally low deal premia. 176
More fundamentally, a great many merger transactions take place
without a true "market test" in the form of a competitive auction.
Formally, the procedure by which a merger is negotiated is not strictly
relevant in an appraisal proceeding.' 77 In practice, however, many
appraisal proceedings involve transactions where there is reason to doubt
the probity of the process. Most obviously, when an existing majority
shareholder takes a company private or otherwise freezes out the minority
shareholders, the potential for abusive expropriation is plain. Indeed, we
found that such going-private transactions were significantly more likely

Delaware Supreme Court revitalized the appraisal remedy by allowing the use of forward-looking
valuation methods. 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983).
174. R. FRANKLIN BALoTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, Delaware Appraisal Cases-Valuation
Methods, in THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. Supp.

2013) (starting place was Table 9-1). We supplemented the information collected from that treatise
with information obtained by reviewing court documents, news reports, and SEC filings.

175.

These very large percentages increases stem from the fact that the original merger

consideration in these cases was very nearly zero.
176. See supra Part IlI.B. It remains possible that courts routinely undervalue shares in appraisal,

which is more difficult to disprove.
177. See Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GTLP, II A.3d 214, 217-18 (Del. 2010).
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to face an appraisal petition.' 7 8 In addition, we were struck by the number
of transactions where the merger price was actually below the market price
prior to the announcement-sometimes substantially below. Of 1168
appraisal-eligible transactions between 2004 and 2013, 4.5% of them had
a negotiated merger price that was below the market price one day prior to
announcement. While it can certainly be the case that a price below the
market price represents "fair value,"1 7 9 it would be at least somewhat
anomalous to insist that it is never appropriate to second-guess the
judgment of the deal market, where the deal market has itself secondguessed the presumably much broader and more liquid stock market.
That is not to say that criticism of court-performed valuation is never
valid. Where there has been a genuine market test, in the form of a free
and fair auction for control of the company, it would be nothing but
mischief to allow a shareholder to ask a court to second-guess the
outcome. As we discuss more fully in the next section, it may be desirable
to allow acquirers "safe harbor" from appraisal where they can show that a
true market test has taken place.s0
Nonetheless, where a market test is lacking, appraisal can serve as a
valuable check on abusive transactions. If appraisal is to be effective in
this role, however, rather than a series of one-off windfalls, appraisal
arbitrage must play a crucial role. As such, it is a phenomenon that should
be encouraged, rather than smothered in its crib.
V. POTENTIAL REFORMS
In this section, we explore two types of potential reforms. First we
examine a variety of ways to reform appraisal in Delaware, and we adopt
something of a Hippocratic approach. Appraisal appears to be working
well now, and our primary goal is to avoid undermining it. Nevertheless,
some reforms appear appropriate. We tentatively propose expanding
appraisal to stock transactions while at the same time creating a safe
harbor for transactions where there has been a genuine market test for

178. Across our entire sample, 165 of our 1,167 (10%) transactions involved a going-private
transaction. Of the going-private transactions, 15% attracted an appraisal petition, compared to only
6% of the other transactions. The difference using a chi-square is statistically significant beyond the
1% level.
179. One relatively common scenario where this may be the case is where news of a pending deal
has reached the market but the deal price is not yet public, and the market overestimates the likely deal

price.
180. See infra Part V.A.
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control of the firm. The second type of reform we consider is how
appraisal might serve as a model for other types of stockholder litigation.
A. Reforming Appraisal in Delaware
The fact that appraisal appears to be working relatively well suggests
that radical reforms designed to substantially alter incentives are both
unnecessary and unlikely to be beneficial. Two potential reforms that have
occasionally been proposed stand out as particularly misguided. First,
some have criticized the holding of Transkaryotic, arguing that appraisal
petitioners should have to show that the actual shares they own were not
voted in favor of the merger.18 1 At present-given the way the vast
majority of transactions are cleared by the Depository Trust Company and
Cede 82-it would generally be impossible for new purchasers to prove
how the shares they own had been voted. As a result, this proposal would
make appraisal arbitrage effectively impossible. Indeed, that is generally
the point of the proposal. Because appraisal arbitrage is actually crucial to
the effectiveness of appraisal as a governance mechanism, such a "reform"
is unappealing.
Second, Professor Geis has recently proposed a reform designed to
discourage "extortionate" appraisal claims. 183 He suggests that appraisal
petitioners be required as part of the demand process to declare what they
believe to be the "fair value" of the stock. They must at the same time
write an embedded put option that would give the acquirer the right to sell
the petitioners an additional share of stock for each share-seeking
appraisal. The strike price is the fair value declared by the dissenter, and
the shares sold under the put would also be part of the appraisal
proceeding. The proposal is intended to give the dissenter an incentive to
name an accurate price and is explicitly intended to increase the risk of
bringing an appraisal proceeding in order to deter nuisance suits. 184 Geis,
of course, wrote without a full picture on the merits of appraisal litigation.
The empirical results presented here reveal that the existing incentives
facing appraisal petitioners already encourage meritorious claims, thus
rendering Geis's proposed changes unnecessary.
The goal of the proposal is to call the bluff of petitioners who demand
too much. Respondents, however, already have a basic but formidable

181.

See supra Part 1I.D.

182. See Geis, supranote 34, at 1650-52.
183. See id. at 1670-76.
184. Id. at 1676.
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mechanism for doing so: refusing to settle and taking the case to trial.
With a real petitioner facing the prospect of real litigation costs,
proceeding to trial, while not without cost, is a comparatively direct way
for respondents to battle nuisance claims.
Even on its own terms, however, the proposal is misguided. The
appraisal petitioner operates at an informational disadvantage. Under
current practice, a petitioner does not declare their estimate of the "fair
value" until their pre-trial brief, after the benefit of discovery: reviewing
documents, receiving interrogatories, and deposing relevant parties. Most
fundamentally, it does not genuinely improve the incentive structure of
appraisal. Merger transactions already involve one party-the acquirerwriting an implied put that gives the other party-the shareholder-the
right to either exercise the put or go into appraisal. Geis's proposal simply
switches the burden to the shareholder to name an accurate price at his
peril, as an (unnecessary) measure for deterring strike suits, and even
though the shareholder is almost certainly operating at a significant
informational disadvantage. Appraisal, under this framework, might
become so unpalatable as to be rendered a nullity.
This is not to say that Delaware's appraisal statute is a flawless gem in
no need of polishing. But given that appraisal appears to be working
relatively well, we believe that any changes should be approached with a
measure of caution and should be aimed at refining appraisal rather than
limiting it. We tentatively offer two suggestions for improvement, one of
which would broaden the availability of appraisal somewhat and the other
of which would limit it. First, the so-called "market-out" exception in the
current statute makes no sense.' 85 The usual rationale for the exception is
that appraisal is unnecessary where shareholders have the option of simply
selling their shares on the open market for what is presumably fair
value.1 8 6 The obvious problem with this rationale is that it envisions

185. Seesupra note 38, at 12.
186. See, e.g., Jeff Goetz, A Dissent Dampened by Timing: How the Stock Market Exception
Systematically Deprives Public Shareholders of Fair Value, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 771,

787-88 (2010) ("[Piroponents argue, as Professor Manning did, that the market adequately values
stock; valuation through appraisal is unnecessary because dissenting shareholders can sell their shares
on the market for the appropriate price.") (internal citations omitted); David J. Ratway, Delaware's
Stock

Market Exception to Appraisal Rights: Dissenting Minority Stockholders of Warner

Communications, Inc. are "Market-Out " of Luck, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 179, 205 (1996) ("Proponents of
the 'market-out' exception claim that with a publicly-traded stock, the stock market price is an
accurate and fair valuation of the stock. Therefore, expensive judicial determination of the fair value

would be redundant."); Michael R. Schwenk, Valuation Problems in the Appraisal Remedy, 16
CARDOzo L. REV. 649, 681-82 (1994) ("Ifthe shareholder can receive the fair value of his or her
stock by selling it in the market, then there is no need for a judicial proceeding to determine this value.
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minority shareholders selling their shares once the transaction has been
announced, by which time the horse has already left the barn. Once
dissenters can sell their shares, the fact of the merger-potentially at an
87
unfair price-has already been incorporated into the market price.'
Perhaps aware of this difficulty, Delaware has crafted an exception to
the market-out exception for when the shareholders receive as merger
consideration anything other than shares in the surviving corporation or
shares in another widely traded corporation.'" Thus, public company
appraisal in Delaware is largely limited to situations where shareholders
are required to take cash as some portion of the merger consideration. This
"exception to the exception," however, does little to solve the problem.
Just because the stockholder ends up with marketable securities at the end
of the day does not mean he is able to receive fair value for his original
shares.
To take an extreme example, consider stockholders of Company A,
whose stock is trading at $100 per share. Suppose the board of Company
A agrees to merge with some acquirer, and under the merger each
Company A stockholder will receive one share of Company B stock for
each Company A share. Suppose further that Company B stock is trading
for $50 per share. A minority shareholder in Company A would be left
with shares in Company B, worth only half of what his original shares
were worth, but he would be unable to pursue appraisal as the statute is
currently constituted. The fact that the consideration the shareholder
received was in the form of liquid securities would be of little consolation;
cash is liquid, too.
Because the adequacy of the consideration paid in a merger does not, at
the end of the day, depend on the form of that consideration, neither
should the availability of the appraisal remedy. Thus, the first reform we
suggest is that the form of merger consideration should be irrelevant to
eligibility for appraisal. Indeed, for similar reasons we also suggest that
the sale of all assets ought to trigger appraisal rights that can be exercised
against the purchaser of the assets, as under the MBCA.

It has already been set with the best source of information regarding values: a competitive market.");
Wertheimer, supranote 31, at 633.
187. See Goetz, supra note 186, at 794 ("[S]ince most shareholders that might wish to dissent
from the transaction learn about the transaction when the rest of the market does-at the time of the
public announcement, they can only sell their shares after that announcement. . . . Consequently,

dissenting shareholders will only be able to sell their interests in the company after the merger's value
has become incorporated into the company's share price.") (footnote omitted).
188. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (b)(2) (2015).
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Our second proposed reform is to allow acquirers a safe harbor from
appraisal claims where they can demonstrate that the merger price was
subjected to a genuine market test. As we noted above, where a free and
fair auction has taken place, it makes little sense to allow a law-trained
chancellor-even the experts on the Delaware Court of Chancery-to
second-guess the price set by the market. In a recent opinion in an
appraisal case,' 89 Vice Chancellor Glasscock drew an analogy to
reviewing a real estate transaction that had been conducted at arm's length.
He suggested that "[a] law-trained judge ... would have no reason to
second-guess the market price absent demonstration of self-dealing or a
flawed sales process." 90 After observing that he was "faced with a similar
situation in this much more complex venue of the sale of a corporate
enterprise," he lamented that the "statute and interpreting case law direct
that I not rely presumptively on the price achieved by exposing the
company to the market." 1 91
Vice Chancellor Glasscock is right to lament; appraisal makes little
sense where there has been a true market test. Satisfying one of the various
Revlon-type tests, however, is not necessarily a market test. We would
allow acquirers a safe harbor only where such a genuine market test has
occurred. Perhaps the most obvious way to do so is to require petitioners
to show that a market test was lacking. There is reason to think this would
be sub-optimal, however. Making the process and the motivations of the
parties relevant to the petitioner's case would potentially expand the scope
of legitimate discovery demands upon the defendant. This may result in
precisely the kind of large, asymmetric litigation costs that could fuel
settlement of nuisance claims. 19 2 Turning every appraisal action into a
mini-Revlon claim is not in anyone's interests. A better solution would be
to maintain the formal irrelevance of deal process to the petitioner's case
but allow the defendants the option of mooting the claim by demonstrating
that a true market test had been performed.
The difficulty is in defining our safe harbor. Borrowing directly from
any of the doctrines that apply to mergers in the fiduciary context-like
Revlon or In re MFW-would result in something far too permissive; we
are not inclined to expand the safe harbor far beyond a genuine auction for
control of the company. In our view, for example, the power vested in an
independent board committee or a majority of the minority shareholders to

189. HuffFund Inv. P'ship v. CKx Inc., C.A. No. 6844-VCG, memo. op. (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013).
190. Id. at *2.
191. Id. at *2-3.
192.

See supra Part Ill.A.
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"say no" to a transaction would not be sufficient. These mechanisms set
up, at best, a Hobson's choice for existing shareholders, and it is precisely
in these scenarios where appraisal is useful.
At a minimum, we believe that to qualify for a safe harbor against
appraisal, the process should have to satisfy the requirements of Section
5.15 of the American Law Institute's 1994 Principles of Corporate
93
Section 5.15(b)
Governance, regarding interested director mergers.1
(2) that
transaction;
proposed
of
a
disclosure
public
would require (1)
information
relevant
potential competing bidders be provided with
concerning the target and given a reasonable opportunity to submit a
competing bid; and (3) after complying with (1) and (2), a majority of
disinterested directors and minority shareholders must approve.194
The ALI would allow use of various lock-up provisions, including
1 95
While
commitments to pay a termination fee to cover bidder expenses.
we
to
shareholders,
lock-ups will often be appropriate, and even beneficial
would not be inclined to extend the safe harbor this far. Even standard
lock-up provisions like termination fees and matching rights have the
potential to harm minority shareholders by discouraging competing
bidders. We are here addressing only a safe harbor where none before
existed, not a standard for liability. Thus, we can safely set a very high bar
for what will constitute a genuine market test. The potential for mischief
even with common lock-ups is great enough that appraisal will at least
sometimes be justified. As such, it seems appropriate to offer management
and potential acquirers a choice. They may use lock-up provisions and
face a possible appraisal claim, which is, after all, the status quo. Or they
may forego deal protection and take advantage of the safe harbor. Which
option is more advantageous will likely be highly context-specific.
B. Appraisalas a Model for ShareholderLitigation
Beyond these modest reforms to what already appears to be a wellfunctioning appraisal remedy, it is worth asking what aspects of appraisal
might usefully serve as templates for reforming the profoundly
dysfunctional system of fiduciary duty class actions. Elsewhere, we have

193.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

§

5.15

(1994).
194. Id. Incidentally, the ALl suggested that appraisal rights need not arise if these procedures are
followed. See id. § 7.21 cmt. c(3), at 306 ("Given that § 5.15(b) supplies an adequate market test, there
is no need to extend a judicial remedy through appraisal when this test is satisfied.").
195. Id § 5.15 cmt. c(3), at 369.
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proposed several fairly straightforward reforms.' 9 6 These range from lead
plaintiff provisions akin to those found in the PSLRA, 19 7 to reforms to
D&O insurance,1 9 8 to switching from an opt-out to an opt-in class
structure. 99

We also made some tentative suggestions regarding eliminating the
contemporaneous ownership requirement from fiduciary duty class
actions.200 In light of our findings above regarding the expansion of
appraisal arbitrage, it seems appropriate to expand somewhat upon this
notion. As of now, appraisal is unique among stockholder litigation in its
opt-in class and lack of any contemporaneous ownership requirement.
While the structure of standard aggregate stockholder litigation is that a
small holder can speak on behalf of millions of non-present investors, with
the risk that the process may be hijacked by plaintiffs' attorneys, in
appraisal the petitioner must put his money where his mouth is.
As currently structured, the universe of potential lead plaintiffs is
limited to shareholders who happened to own their shares when the
transaction was announced.20 ' While this universe may include large
institutional investors with the resources and economic incentives to serve
as effective monitors on class counsel, they are also likely to be diversified
investors with little expertise or interest in pursuing litigation.202
Eliminating the contemporaneous ownership requirement in derivative

196. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.
197. Id. at 832 n.10; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(B) (2012).
198.

See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15, at 891.

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Dieter v. Prime Computer, Inc., 681 A.2d 1068, 1072-73 (Del. Ch. 1996) (holding that
an after-acquiring stockholder was disqualified from serving as class representative). See also A.
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS

ORGANIZATIONS § 13.25 (3d ed. 2011) (citing Leighton v. Lewis, 577 A.2d 753 (Del. 1990)) ("[A]
stockholder who purchases shares of stock after the announcement of the challenged merger should
not be permitted to maintain a class action challenging the merger since he is not truly a member of the

class."). Although precluded from service as lead plaintiff, after-acquiring stockholders are
nevertheless often eligible to receive any benefits of the class action settlement because settlement
classes are commonly defined to include transferees. See In re Prodigy Commc'n Corp. S'holders
Litig., 2002 WL 1767543, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2002) ("[W]hen a claim is asserted on behalf of a
class of stockholders challenging the fairness of the terms of a proposed transaction under Delaware
law, the class will ordinarily consist of those persons who held shares as of the date the transaction was
announced and their transferees, successors and assigns."). Due to the extreme rarity of monetary

recovery, however, inclusion in the recovery class without an ability to influence the litigation is of
limited practical utility.
202. Professors Cox and Thomas find that most institutional investors fail to even file to get their
share of class action settlements. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the
Table: Do Institutional Investors Fair to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q.

855 (2002).
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litigation and securities litigation would allow specialized institutional
investors-such as those we find pursuing appraisal arbitrage-to seek out
strong legal claims, and seek to accumulate a large position for pursuing
litigation. In so doing, they would solve the collective action problems that
otherwise plague shareholder litigation without simultaneously creating a
serious agency problem, and would further both the deterrence and
compensation functions of such litigation.
While this reform may seem radical, it was actually suggested in 2008
203
by no less than now-Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster. Laster proposed
that derivative plaintiffs simply be required to "(1) hold stock at the time
of the lawsuit and (2) not voluntarily divest the stock during the
lawsuit." 204 He identifies the contemporaneous ownership rule as having
originally been created to "prevent corporations from manufacturing
20 5
a problem that
diversity jurisdiction for claims against third parties,"
"obviously does not afflict the state courts of Delaware, whose jurisdiction
does not turn on diversity of citizenship."206 Since that time, however, the
alleged justification for the rule has morphed into the supposed necessity
of preventing the alleged "evil" of an individual purchasing shares with
20 7
the purpose of bringing suit.

As Laster notes, however, the nature of this "evil" is not entirely clear.
The "evil" is often described, without further analysis, as purchasing stock
"with litigious motives." 208 But after-purchasers of stock are not
"strangers" to the dispute as under the old doctrines of champerty or
maintenance, in that the purchase of shares "necessarily gives the acquirer
2 09
An after-purchaser
an equitable interest in the underlying corporation."
as any other
corporation
the
in
interest
has the same continuing
shareholder. As Laster concludes, "[a] plaintiff who can effectively
vindicate corporate rights should not be prevented from conferring

203.

J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J.

CORP. L. 673 (2008).
204. Id. at 673.
205. Id. at 678 (citing Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 60 A.2d 106, 111 n.4 (Del. Ch. 1948)).
206.

Laster, supra note 203, at 679.

207. See id.; Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 203 (Del. 2008) (claiming that the rule was intended
"solely to prevent what has been considered an evil, namely, the purchasing of shares in order to
maintain a derivative action designed to attack a transaction which occurred prior to the purchase of

the stock.") (footnote omitted); Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 264 n.12 (Del.
1995) (describing the policy against suits by "an individual [who] purchases stock in a corporation
with purely litigious motives.").
208. See, e.g., Ala. By-Prods. Corp., 657 A.2d at 264 n.12; Screiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 516
(Del. Ch. 1978).
209. Laster, supra note 203, at 683.
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benefits" on the corporation or its shareholders "simply because the wrong
occurred before the plaintiff purchased its shares." 2 10
Nor is it plausible to consider the contemporaneous ownership
requirement as an effective control on meritless strike suits. As we have
shown elsewhere, the prevalence of meritless merger litigation could
hardly become worse. 2'1 More likely, a professional investor being willing
to invest a substantial sum in the expectation of bringing suit would
represent a signal of merit. As Laster noted, "a stockholder purchasing
shares with 'litigious motives' might be expected to have identified a
relatively strong claim so as to make it worthwhile to expend funds both to
purchase the shares and to bring the case." 2 12 Our findings regarding
appraisal litigation strongly support Laster's intuition. Far from barring
claims by after-purchasers, the Delaware courts should presume that such
plaintiffs will function as the best monitors of a class action, and they
should view with great suspicion any suit so weak that no investor was
willing to invest substantial resources in pursuing it.
CONCLUSION

Until now, the academic consensus has been that appraisal litigation is
a peripheral sideshow. This view, which may have been accurate as
recently as 2009, must now be radically revised. Appraisal litigation is
undergoing a period of rapid growth, characterized by a new breed of
sophisticated repeat petitioners.
Given the well-known pathologies of shareholder litigation, the
increase in appraisal litigation might be regarded with some degree of
apprehension. We show, however, that far from representing a new
frontier in vexatious litigation, appraisal litigation is a unique form of
shareholder litigation where the merits are highly relevant to the decision
to bring suit. The structure of appraisal litigation is such that petitioners
are able to reap the benefits of bringing a meritorious claim and are likely
to suffer consequences from bringing a non-meritorious claim. Our data
bear out these theoretical conclusions.
More importantly, the growth of appraisal promises to bring genuine
benefits to shareholders in general, both in terms of providing real
deterrence against management and controlling shareholder opportunism
and negligence and in terms of providing meaningful compensation where

210. Id. at 684.
211.

See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 15.

212. Laster, supra note 203, at 689.
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such behavior persists. By purchasing shares after the announcement of an
opportunistic transaction with the intention of pursuing appraisal, appraisal
arbitrageurs share the compensation achieved through appraisal even with
those minority shareholders who do not pursue appraisal themselves.
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